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SUMMARY. 
 
 
 This dissertation discusses logistical aspects of the Persians invasion of 
Greece; the Athenian need for timber for building warships; supply 
problems in their assault on Syracuse; and the march of Alexander’s army 
from Macedonia into Asia. 
 The amount of cereals needed by the Persian and Greek armies 
and navies is calculated from modern nutritional data and an estimate of 
the numbers of combatants. The location and size of the Persian food 
dumps; the excavation of the Athos canal; and the ships and materials 
needed to build the bridges of boats are considered.  
 The Athenian need for ship-timber led to the costly occupation of 
Amphipolis. An assured supply of cereals was one motive for the disastrous 
Sicilian Expedition. The Athenian fleet was an inefficient long-range support 
for an army which had to protect its non-combatant sailors. This was 
realised by Alexander the Great, who crossed the Hellespont without naval 
support. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Logistics 
     The word “logistics” can be generally defined as “The planning 
and carrying out of any complex or large scale civil or military operation”. It 
is a word that had little currency before World War II, before which it meant 
“strategy” or “philosophy of war” or an archaic branch of knowledge 
related to mathematics.1 This dissertation was prompted by the study of 
General Sir Frederick Maurice’s seventy-five-year-old paper on Xerxes’ 
crossing of the Hellespont in 480 BC.2 His concern was to estimate the size of 
the Persian army, not to discuss the logistics which supported it. Although it is 
very much out of date, his paper is perhaps the seminal work which has 
prompted later work on ancient  military  logistics.  
 It has been pointed out that studies of ancient military campaigns  
generally assume that armies “lived off the land” and these comfortable 
assumptions relieved the authors of any necessity to consider how an army 
(or navy for that matter) was kept operative in the field or at sea.3 Such  
assumptions  lead to  distorted views of war.  This being so, it must be borne 
in mind that the ancient authors addressed a limited audience of educated 
contemporaries, a considerable proportion of whom had  both executive 
and combat experience of war, and so naturally assumed that their readers 
understood without amplification what they were saying and, as a result, 
took a great deal for granted. Consequently, modern readers are obliged 
to rely on conjecture and fill the gaps with probably incorrect conclusions. It 
is only in recent times that the logistics of ancient warfare have been 
studied as a discipline, and, with the exception of the corn supply to Athens 
and Rome, what might be termed ancient “civil logistics”, have received 
little attention. This dissertation discusses examples of ancient logistical 
problems of a military nature in Greek history. Chapter One discusses 
logistical problems which had to be solved by the Persians before and 
                                             
1 Leighton,R. Encyclopaedia Britannica, London 1964,14. 325. 
2 Maurice F. The Size of the Army of Xerxes in the Invasion of Greece 480 BC. 
  Journal of Hellenic Studies. 50,(2).1930, 210-235. 
3 Roth J. The Logistics of the Roman Army in the Jewish War. Doctoral Thesis. 
Ohio.1991. 
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during their invasion of Greece in 480 BC.  Chapter Two reviews the two 
unsuccessful Athenian colonisations of Amphipolis, an area rich in timber 
which was needed to maintain their huge fleet, which had to protect the 
supply routes of the grain ships. The ever-present threat of famine was taken 
for granted and the need for an assured supply of grain only tangentially 
mentioned by Thucydides. In the absence of inscriptional or little other 
documentary information, the consequences are largely speculative.  
Chapter Three discusses how growing Athenian long-range aggression 
culminated in the Sicilian Expedition which is followed as far as the point 
where planned support for the invading army ceased and Nicias retreated 
from Syracuse, his army carrying its food and water. 
Chapter Four is a short description of Alexander’s crossing of the 
Hellespont with manageable and well supplied forces, in the prelude to the 
careful logistics of his victorious Asian campaign, which is outside the scope 
of this study. 
The references to book, chapter and paragraph in Herodotus, 
Thucydides and Xenophon are taken from the Loeb translations of the 
works, but the modern English of the Penguin editions is preferred for most 
quotations. Numbers of four or more figures, and units of length and mass, 
are written in full as arithmetic and metric conventions differ. 
Early application of logistics. 
 The Assyrians are credited with being the first state able to support a 
standing army, unlike their hostile neighbours who called up their citizen 
farmer-soldiers for campaigns which were fought during the interval 
between crops being sown and harvested. The Assyrian army was available 
at any time of the year and probably numbered about fifty thousand men.4 
It included an effective supply organisation for desert and mountain 
warfare known as the musarkisus which, amongst other tasks, obtained, 
bred and trained, three thousand horses a month to supply the cavalry, 
                                             
4 Thompson J.T. The Lifeblood of War, Brassey 11; and also Gabriel R.A. & 
Metz K. S. From Sumer to Rome, the Military Capabilities of Ancient Armies. 
Greenwood. N.Y. 1991.   
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and additionally supplied the necessary fodder as well.5  It also had to 
supply and feed the oxen needed to move the equipment for siege-trains 
which had been developed to counter the increasingly sophisticated 
fortifications of the cities  which defied their investing armies.6 
Water and large armies. 
 Despite his logistical expertise and overwhelming military superiority 
the Assyrian king Sennacherib was foiled in his attempt to capture 
Jerusalem in 701 BC. The Judean king Hezekiah (715-687 BC) had 
excavated a tunnel from a spring outside the city walls to a pool within 
them.7  By blocking up the spring outside the walls he denied the Assyrian 
army water and ensured its retreat. This early example emphasises the 
prime importance of the availability of water, even before food supplies are 
considered. This essential factor in military planning will be discussed in more 
detail in the crossing of the Hellespont by the Persian army in 480 BC. 
------oooo------ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             
5 Gabriel & Metz : 1991, 3. 
6 New English Bible. 2 Chronicles. 32. 
7 Scheffler, E. Fascinating  Discoveries from the Biblical World, Biblia. Pretoria. 
2000. 19. 
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CHAPTER ONE. 
CROSSING THE HELLESPONT: Unexpected defeat. 
 
The Persian Achaemenid kings lost no opportunity to proclaim their 
self-adulation in inscriptions such as Darius’ trilingual one at Behistun and 
those on the palace walls of Susa and Persepolis. His son Xerxes followed 
suit, but rather naturally did not leave a memorial of his repulse from 
Greece in 480 BC.  Herodotus reports that the king’s secretaries took down 
notes of all that he needed to know, but none of these records survive.8 The 
only account of Xerxes’ invasion from the Persian side comes from the late 
fifth century Greek, Ktesias of Cnidos who was physician to Artaxerxes II. His 
unreliability makes Herodotus seem a model of accuracy.9 
The sources   
 Writing about the events 50 years later, Herodotus has left us a vivid 
picture of Xerxes’ invasion, explaining the reasons for it in a long preamble 
of five books. He painstakingly recorded the recollections of surviving 
combatants. Although his account is a major part of his “Histories”, 
occupying the last three of its nine books, it is not detailed enough to satisfy 
the curiosity of modern readers, who are frustrated by gaps and 
questionable assertions.  Nevertheless his record is an intriguing picture of a 
military adventure of a size and boldness not seen again anywhere until 
Napoleon’s campaigns twenty two centuries later. 
 Some five centuries after Herodotus, Plutarch gave some insights into 
the Greek defence through his “Life” of Themistocles, which one 
commentator says had little historical support, to the point of contradicting 
Thucydides.  However Plutarch must not be neglected as he had access to 
other sources which have not survived.10 
 
 
                                             
8 e.g. Herodt. 7.100.8. & 8.90. 
9 Burn A.R. Persia and the Greeks. Duckworth. London.1984,11. et seq. 
10 Plutarch.The Rise and Fall of Athens. tr Scott-Kilvert I. Penguin. Harmondsworth.   
1975. 
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Persian logistics 
  When the Persians absorbed the Assyrian and Neo-Babylonian 
polities into their empire, the conquerors learned a great deal from them 
about the movement and supply of large armies over great distances, and 
put their acquired skills into practice. They certainly did not build roads in 
the Roman sense, but so improved on the old Assyrian routes, for example 
the two thousand kilometre “Royal Road” from Susa to Sardis, that they 
were able to move large numbers of troops and supply them across the 
wide expanses of their empire. No people could be less thalassic than the 
Persians, so they sensibly pressed their maritime Phoenician, Ionian and 
Egyptian subjects into building and manning commercial and fighting ships 
for their overseas ventures. This did mean however that they had to rely on 
the sometimes doubtful loyalties of their sea-going subjects.11  The invasion 
of Greece by Xerxes in 480 BC in revenge for the defeat of his father Darius 
by Athens at Marathon ten years earlier was a complex exercise in military 
logistics, which the king ordered and his “general staff” commenced 
planning years before the event.  Like his successor Thucydides, Herodotus’ 
reports on the discussions between the king and his advisers are almost 
certainly invented but illustrate some of the logistical problems which had to 
be solved. 
Military intelligence 
 The Persians were well aware that the Greek poleis were habitually 
warring with each other with armies of almost untrained gentleman soldiers 
led by amateur officers chosen by lot rather than ability. They knew that   
Sparta was the only Greek state with what amounted to a professional 
standing army of only a few thousand men.12 They would have had a good 
idea of the size of a combined army which could be assembled by those 
states prepared to oppose the invaders. They would have known too, 
                                             
11 Herodt. 8. 9. and 8. 22.  
12 Anderson J.K. Military Theory and Practice in the Age of 
Xenophon.University of California, Berkeley.1970. 6. 
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about Themistocles’ plans to build a fleet of warships with proceeds from 
the unexpected find of a rich vein of silver in the Laurium mines.13 
Planning 
  Most wars, particularly ancient ones, were fought with the intention 
of making a profit from booty such as gold and slaves. With the backing of 
their huge wealth the balance sheet of invasion was of no importance to 
the Persians. They were well aware that Greece was singularly lacking in 
resources and sought only revenge for their defeat at Marathon, and in the 
process, burn Athens to the ground in retaliation for the destruction of Sardis 
by the Athenians during the Ionian rebellion in 498.14  Instead of planning an 
invasion with forces sufficient to ensure victory, they put together at huge 
cost, a grandiose exhibition of overwhelming strength. The numbers of their 
army and navy combined being much the same as the total population of 
Attica.15   
The Athos Canal 
  In 492 Darius’ fleet invading Greece lost 300 warships in a sudden 
storm whilst rounding the Athos peninsular.16 In his turn, Xerxes was not 
prepared to take the risk of a similar loss to his fleet, and decided that the 
excavation of a canal through the sandy narrow neck of the peninsula was 
a fair trade-off. Indeed, the manpower and time needed to build 300 
triremes and excavate a canal were probably of much the same order. In 
recording this venture Herodotus thought that the cutting of the canal was 
unnecessary. It was begun three years before the army was assembled and 
was a massive civil engineering effort in itself.  
He says that:-17 
A fleet of triremes lay at Elaeus in the Chersonese, and from this 
base men of the various nations of which the army was composed were 
                                             
13 Herodt. 7.144. 
14 Herodt. 5.101. 
15 Jones A.H.M. Athenian Democracy. Blackwell. Oxford. 1989.  8-10, 
                                                                                              76-79,161-180. 
16 Herodt. 6.44. 
17 Herodt. 7.22. 
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sent over in shifts to Athos where they were put to work of cutting the canal 
under the lash. 
The fact that the Athos peninsula is about 180 km from Elaeus was 
not considered a difficulty by the planners.  Herodotus mentions that the 
ready-ground meal “in great quantity” for the rations of the canal-diggers 
was sent to Athos from Asia.18 Herodotus does not mention how many men 
were sent to dig the canal, but the task of feeding what must have been 
several thousands, was an essential but hardly noticed aspect of the 
forward planning which involved supplying several tons of ground meal 
daily, for some three years, from an unnamed source some 200 kilometres 
away on the Asian shore of the Aegean Sea. It is surprising that with food 
dumps already being established not far away at Eion on the Strymon and 
Doriscus, that the grain was not supplied from one of them and ground for 
the canal workers on site.  It has been suggested that the workers were paid 
in cash and bought the meal at a market in the labour camp. This 
assumption is supported by the finding of a hoard of 300 darics nearby, 
probably dating from that time.19 The availability of water in this sandy area 
must have been a major problem as there is no river nearby, so it was 
probably obtained from wells dug on site.   
This huge excavation task does not seem to have been generally 
appreciated by historians, some of whom confine themselves to noting that 
the width of the sandy peninsular at its narrowest is 2.5 kilometres. 
Hammond however does say that  its highest point is 50 feet (15 metres) 
above sea-level.20  Xerxes ordered that two triremes should be able to row 
through the canal side-by-side that is, requiring a navigable width of 20 
metres. This has been confirmed by geophysical exploration which has 
shown a width at the top of 25 to 35 metres and 20 metres at the bottom. 
Core samples have shown an absence of the remains of marine animals or 
                                             
18 Herodt. 7. 23. 
19 Burn: 1984, 318. 
20 Hammond N.G.L. A History of Greece. Clarendon.Oxford. 1989. 218. 
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plants, indicating that the canal had a very short life.21 If the average height 
of the isthmus above sea-level from end to end is taken as 8 metres and a 
depth of water in the canal of two metres sufficient to float the warships, 
and with the banks sloped at 45 degrees, then between 1.5 and 2 million 
tons of soil had to be dug out, and carried far enough away from the 
excavation to avoid the spoil slipping back into the cutting.  The only tools 
would have been mattocks, wooden spades, wicker baskets and ropes for 
hauling the filled baskets out of the cutting. Bearing in mind that sand has 
drifted over the millennia, the pictures on the opposite page give some 
idea of the immensity of the task. 
By using the theoretical average cross-section dimensions opposite 
and accepting that the canal took three years to excavate, it can be 
calculated that if three men could dig out and carry one ton a day to the 
spoil banks, then approximately four thousand men would have been 
employed excavating the canal, the breakwaters at each end, and the 
coffer dams to keep the sea out until the excavation was complete.  Such 
a number of workers would have needed at least four tons of cereal a day 
and a similar amount of firewood brought in, as the locality would have 
soon been denuded of kindling. 
 This great effort was made for the sole purpose of ensuring that the 
Persian battle fleet and supply ships would not have to risk doubling the 
Athos peninsular with its  30 kilometres of dangerous lee shore.  Xerxes’ fleet 
passed through the canal just once, its militarily useful life being a few weeks 
at most. Herodotus would have had the diolkos slipway over the Isthmus of 
Corinth in mind, when he remarked that the canal was a display of sheer 
ostentation.22  On the other hand it has been pointed out that the time 
taken to drag each ship of the huge trireme fleet over the two and a half 
kilometre-wide sandy isthmus would have taken a great deal longer than 
sailing through the canal.23 
                                             
21 Karastakis V.K. & Papamarinopolus S.P.  The Detection of Xerxes’ Canal by 
Shallow Reflection and Refraction Seismics. Geophysical Prospecting.  May 
1997. 389-401.     
22 Herodt. 7.24. 
23 Burn: 1984, 318. 
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The food dumps 
 Herodotus says that during the time that the canal was being cut, 
food dumps were being established, close to the mouths of perennial rivers, 
along the expected line of march of the invaders.24 He says that the biggest 
one was at Leuce Acte in Thrace and names the others, from east to west, 
at Tyrodiza in Perinthian territory, Doriscus at the mouth of the Hebrus, Eion 
on the Strymon, and another “in Macedonia”. Both Doriscus and Eion had 
been strongly garrisoned by the Persians since Darius’ invasion of Thrace in 
492 and were ideal sites for building, filling and maintaining granaries under 
competent guarding and supervision until they were emptied by the 
passing army. The Persians probably had little practice in the long-term 
storage of cereals, but their Egyptian subjects could call on millennia of 
experience in the building of granaries capable of holding the required 
tonnages.25       
Leuce  Acte 
 It is convenient at this point to present an argument for the location 
of the food store which Herodotus says was “in Macedonia”, and show that 
it was in fact the Leuce Acte which he names but does not locate. All the 
dumps were of course in Persian controlled or friendly territory. Maurice 
translates Leuce Acte as “White Beach” and thought it to be at the head of 
the Gulf of Melas.26  (See map facing p 37). Other scholars agree with 
Maurice.27 “White Cape” has also been suggested which is placed at the 
western end of the Propontis.28 Strabo  who wrote almost five centuries after 
Herodotus, locates Leuce Acte in the Hellespont between Aigospotami and 
Perinthus.29 “Liddell and Scott” confirm Maurice’s translation of Acte as  
                                             
24 Herodt. 7.25. 
25 Kemp.B.J. Ancient Egypt. Routledge. London. 1995, 173,288,309 etc 
26 Maurice:1930, 219. 
  27 Engels D.W. Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian 
Army.California.1978. 29 
28 Burn: 1984, 318. 
29 Strabo. Book 7. (Internet search) 
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“beach” is correct.30 Maurice’s proposed site for Leuce Acte had, by his 
own observation, two days of near-waterless march on the approaches to 
both sides of it, which suggests that it was hardly the place for a major 
distribution point. The name “Leuce Acte” is generic and could have 
applied to any one of several beaches well-known for having white sand, 
whereas most beaches are “golden”. 
  The Persians would have planned for an army of occupation to 
remain in Greece after their expected conquest. In order to keep a large 
occupying army supplied through the winter of 480-79 it would have been 
logical to establish beforehand a major supply point as close as possible to 
enemy territory to minimise the length of an overland supply route when 
sea-borne supply would not have been possible. It would certainly not have 
been as far away as Perinthus. It is suggested that the most likely site for a 
“Leuce Acte” would have been at the head of the Thermaic Gulf (the 
modern Gulf of Thessaloniki) between the mouths of the Rivers Axios 
(modern Vardar) and Haliakmon (Vistriza) where there are extensive 
dazzlingly white beaches popular with modern tourists.31 However, one must 
add the caveat that the coastline at the head of the Thermaic Gulf has 
changed radically since ancient times due to silting by the two swiftly 
flowing rivers.32 Another argument in favour of Leuce Acte being at the 
head of the Thermaic Gulf can be found in Herodotus where he says:-33 
 While the fleet waited near Therma and the Axios…Xerxes with the 
army was on its way from Acanthus. 
 
And further:- 
At Therma Xerxes halted his army and the troops went into camp. 
They occupied the whole seaboard from Therma in Mygdonia to the Lydias 
and Haliakmon…..while they were encamped here ,all the rivers mentioned 
supplied enough water for their needs except the Echeidorus, which dried 
up. 
                                             
30 The word acte  seems to cause some confusion being variously translated 
as “cape”, “headland” , “strand” and “beach” It has been discussed at 
some length by  Bowen A. 1998. in an appendix to his paper. He concludes 
that “beach” is to be preferred. 
31 Internet search “Thessaloniki beaches” 
32 Casson S. Macedonia, Thrace and Illyria. Oxford.1926.15. 
33 Herodt. 7.124. 
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 Whilst both the army and the fleet were concentrated at the 
head of the Thermaic Gulf, three hundred thousand men had to be 
victualled in the same neighbourhood for the period that the army “went 
into camp”.  This could have been possible only if a very large food dump 
had been prepared there in advance and continued to be supplied 
thereafter. Another  argument in favour of Leuce Acte as the unnamed  site 
being at the head of the Thermaic Gulf can be found in the Periplous of the 
near-contemporary Scylax of Caryanda who wrote:-34 
……Beyond Chersonesos is the Bay of Plinthine. The mouth of the 
bay to Leuce Acte is a day and a night’s sail… 
 
One historian adds some weight to this argument by suggesting  
that dumps were further forward in Macedonia, and mentions  Scylax.35 
A 24-hour voyage to the mouth (not head) of the bay would be  
about the right distance to the  Thermaic Gulf which was in Macedonian 
territory and  about 400 kilometres from Attica.  We also know, and 
Herodotus reports it, that Alexander II of Macedon collaborated with the 
Persians and permitted a base on his territory, whilst his relationship with the 
Greeks was at best ambiguous.  Furthermore, the suggested site for Leuce 
Acte was closest the border with Thessaly, the most important Greek state 
which actively “medised”.36 
 Herodotus has nothing to say about the maintenance of the Persian 
army in its winter quarters at Sardis or the location of other dumps on the 
route from Sardis to the crossing point on the Hellespont. There certainly 
must have been food available at the ford over the Scamander. He 
dismisses the major effort of setting up the food dumps in one short 
paragraph although food supply was a crucial factor in the success of the 
venture and an aspect of the Persian effort which needs closer 
consideration. 
                                             
34 Poathe T. & Svensson G. From Portolan Charts toVisual 
Beacons.Proceedings of the Visual Literacy Association Conference. 
Newport R.I. 2003. 
35 Burn: 1984, 318. n14. 
36 Herodt. 7.132. 
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Feeding the Persian army 
  In 482 the Asian contingents of the army assembled at Critalla on 
the River Halys in Cappadocia and together with the Near Eastern troops   
concentrated on Sardis in Lydia where it spent the winter of 481-480. An 
army is like a city on the move and one must admire the feat of logistics 
(about which we have no information) in keeping this huge army fed and 
healthy in bitterly cold Sardis for possibly the three winter months.  When in 
enemy territory, ancient armies “lived off the land” whenever possible, but 
in their own dominions supplies had to be obtained by less drastic means.  It 
is an important point to bear in mind throughout this study that in the 
ancient world famine was never very far away.37 With the exception of 
Athens, which had long outgrown its agricultural capacity and had facilities 
for importing grain from the Black Sea wheat lands, ancient communities 
lived from harvest to harvest and were on short commons in the pre-harvest 
months.38 If the harvest was poor the outlook was grim.  The arrival of an 
army in any neighbourhood meant severe hardship for the inhabitants. 
Herodotus records how the people of Acanthus (who probably had three 
years of relative prosperity whilst the nearby Athos canal was being 
excavated), were utterly ruined and stripped of house and home by the 
passing Persian army, and that was in friendly territory!39 Herodotus’ outrage 
at what must have been a frequent occurrence was echoed by Tacitus six 
centuries later. “……they create desolation and call it peace”.40  
Until quite recently, historians have paid little attention to the 
logistics of ancient armies, relying on the assumption that they lived off the 
land.41 To understand the magnitude of the Persian effort it is necessary to 
obtain some idea of the size of the food dumps established along the 
invasion route and the total amount of foodstuffs needed for the planned 
                                             
37 Jameson M.  Famine in the Greek World. Cambridge.1983. 
38 Rickman. G. The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome Clarendon. Oxford.1980.   
Chapter 1. & see also Engels: 1978.27. 
39 Herodt. 7.118. 
40 Tacitus. “Agricola”  Penguin. 30. 
41 Which Xenophon’s “Ten Thousand” certainly did in their Anabasis 
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duration of the campaign.  That can only be done by using an acceptable 
estimate of the size of Xerxes’ army derived from a reliable  source. 
The size of the army 
Herodotus makes the often questioned assertion that 1.7 million 
infantrymen together with eighty thousand cavalry and twenty thousand 
charioteers- not to mention their camp followers - crossed the Hellespont.42 
An early historian of Greece claimed that “the numbers of Xerxes (army) 
were greater than any assembled in ancient times, or perhaps…in history”.43 
Later historians either accepted Herodotus, or made estimates varying from 
1.2 million to three hundred thousand men. The German historian Delbruck 
posed the question to friends of his on the German General Staff, who 
estimated an army of sixty-five thousand to seventy-five thousand.44  Several 
historians have suggested that there has been confusion of Herodotus’ use 
of µυριος in its original meaning of “countless”, and χιλιοι thus 
inadvertently multiplying his numbers by a factor of ten.45  It is quite 
remarkable that no ancient historian of Xerxes’ invasion, whose works have 
survived, from Herodotus onwards, ever visited the Hellespont. More modern 
ones who might have wished to do so would have been frustrated by the 
Turkish authorities, as the Gallipoli peninsula was for a long time a sensitive 
defence area.  However in 1922, a British soldier, General Sir Frederick 
Maurice, on holiday in Istanbul, was able to take his copy of Herodotus and 
an army map and go over the ground. His observations clarified the 
problems to the satisfaction of most students of the event.46 As will be seen 
below, he concluded that a maximum of one hundred and fifty thousand 
five hundred combatants together with some seventy-five thousand pack 
animals was a likely total. Maurice’s 75 year-old paper is a fascinating 
account by a professional soldier of the logistical problems facing the 
Persian planners in getting their massive army across the Hellespont and into 
Greece. 
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The Supply Train 
 If the Persian supply train was of a size and importance to justify the 
building of a bridge of boats for its exclusive use, it is necessary to get some 
idea of what was carried by about seventy thousand animals.  Although the 
army consisted of weather-hardened men, it is hardly likely that they slept in 
the open throughout the campaign, and probably had some form of tent 
or weather-proof cloak. The most durable material would have been 
leather. It is suggested that the men would have grouped in a manner 
similar to the later Roman contubernia whose leather tents accommodated 
eight men. These were carried on mules together with the stone hand-mills 
used for grinding the grain ration.47 Using this analogy, some eighteen to 
twenty thousand pack-animals would have been needed for that purpose 
alone. The luxurious tents of Xerxes, his generals, and court followers 
together with their furnishings, mobile kitchens and special foods, would 
have required many more. The long marches through almost waterless 
country from the Scamander to the Hebrus would have required large 
amounts of water to be carried both for men and animals as well as three 
days supply of grain for the soldiers and fodder for the animals.  Speculation 
could be misleading on the number of pack animals required for those 
purposes, together with the military hardware such as spears, bows, arrows 
and armour which was not needed until enemy territory was reached. If the 
cavalry mounts are included, a supply train of seventy thousand animals is a 
reasonable assumption. 
What was needed 
Maurice’s estimate of the size of the army, discussed below will be 
used to calculate how much grain was needed to feed it.  It must surely 
have been the case that only non-perishable foodstuffs would have been 
stored in the dumps. Herodotus concentrates on the supply of cereals and 
does not mention whether meat was supplied either dried or on the hoof. 
Some animals would have been needed for sacrificial purposes and to 
supply some meat to the high dignitaries. Mediterranean and Middle 
Eastern peoples were of necessity consumers of cereals although it has 
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been pointed out that the Persians were herdsmen and hence meat-eaters 
and probably had to be supplied with salt meat.48 If that assertion is correct, 
then an extremely long   supply chain had to be set up from the ranches of 
the Persian interior, to a convenient Aegean port, for example, 
Adramyttium. For the purposes of this discussion it is assumed that cereals 
made up a major part of the army’s diet whilst on campaign. It must also be 
borne in mind that the horses, mules and camels also had to be fed with 
both cereals and forage. Indeed, Roth suggests that fodder was a major 
logistical consideration.49 Large tonnages of other foodstuffs such as onions, 
beans, peas or salt would have been needed as relishes.50 
 It was normal practice throughout antiquity to issue the grain ration  
to the troops at intervals of three or more days. They then reduced it to a 
more or less gritty meal with hand-mills, which were carried on pack-animals 
as part of their equipment. The meal was then baked into flat cakes and 
eaten with some salt and vegetable relish like onions. This obviously required 
a fire and hence the need for another major logistical item- firewood.  An 
army remaining in one place for more than a few days swept the 
surrounding countryside clean of anything combustible. One scholar 
emphasises this in noting that 1.2 to 1.5 kilograms of kindling is needed to 
bake one kilogram of flour. An army of one hundred and fifty thousand men 
would therefore use 60 to 75 tons of wood per day.51 
In making an estimate of the supplies needed for the Persian 
forces, it will be assumed that apart from the dumps in Europe there would 
have been at least one other on the ford over the Scamander, on the 
march from Sardis to the crossing point on the Hellespont.  Estimation of the 
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49 Roth : 1991, 217. 
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supplies consumed during the over-wintering period at Sardis and indeed 
where they came from, is too speculative to include in the calculation. 
For this purpose, Engels’ estimates of the daily cereal requirements 
of a soldier of the time, the consumption of fodder and grain by cavalry 
and transport animals are used. In order to simplify the calculations, it is 
assumed that all the pack animals were horses.  It is also assumed that all 
the ethnic groups in the Persian army were fed from the same supplies. It 
has been calculated that the minimum ration for a soldier would have been 
1.36 kilograms of grain and 2 litres of water per day.52 A horse requires 4.5 
kilograms of straw or chaff, 4.5 kilograms of grain and 35 litres of water. 
However, a later investigator suggests that Engels’ estimate of human 
consumption is somewhat too high.53 Whatever the actual daily 
consumption of grain might have been, the purpose of these estimates is to 
get some idea of the   magnitude of the Persian supply effort.  
  The Persian soldiers carried three days’ rations, the dumps being 
three days march apart. Much of their water requirement of about two litres 
a day was carried on pack animals. This meant that each of the dumps 
between the Scamander and Eion would have held three days’ 
requirement of cereals for one hundred and fifty thousand men and 
seventy thousand horses.54 Using the numbers quoted above, that 
requirement would have amounted to 612 tons of cereals for human 
consumption plus 500 tons each of fodder and grain. Thus, to feed the army 
on its march through friendly territory from the Scamander to Macedonia, a 
total of three thousand and sixty tons of grain for immediate human 
consumption and five thousand tons of animal feed had to be procured 
and delivered to the five dumps. 
Before the army moved into Greece, the dump at the head of the  
Thermaic Gulf  would have had to supply four hundred tons of cereal  for  
the men and almost as much for the transport animals for each of the 
unrecorded number of days which Herodotus says that the army and  navy 
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“went into camp”.55 Thereafter it would have been the logical supply point 
for the army of occupation, particularly during the winter months when 
supply by sea was not possible. All of the dumps would have had to be 
supplied by merchant ships unloading on to beaches, except possibly at 
the port of Eion on the Strymon . Consequently there must have been a risk 
of spoilage of the grain by water en route. Cereals have to be stored in dry, 
cool, insect and rodent-proof granaries which had to be built and then 
maintained and guarded from the time they were filled until they were 
emptied by the passing army.56 If it was intended for the dumps to supply 
the returning victorious army, the tonnages would have had to be doubled. 
Herodotus relates that after Salamis, Xerxes marched back to the Hellespont 
in forty-five days with that part of his army escorting him living off the 
country as best they could.57 He says that they ate grass and tree-bark to 
stay their hunger which implies empty granaries along the route. This story 
cannot be accepted without question. The patriotic Herodotus might have 
wished that Xerxes and his army had a bad time getting out of Greece. 
There was no way the Great King and his swarm of high-born functionaries 
would have gone hungry. As has been mentioned above, the  meticulous  
Persian planners must have taken into account the certainty that a 
substantial part of their forces, both army and navy, would have had to 
winter in Attica and Thessaly as an army of occupation, whether or not 
there had been a naval engagement or a land battle.  The army had 
reached Athens at the end of the sailing season in September, and the 
fleet, had it not been defeated, would have been beached at Phaleron for 
the winter.  The Persian planners knew very well that there would be very 
little sea-borne supplies from late September until the following April. They 
knew too that the agricultural potential of peninsular Greece could not 
possibly feed the remaining part of the army and the  navy combined. The 
pack animals which accompanied the invaders would have been 
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unloaded as soon as the army reached Attica.58 They would have then 
been organised in convoys and sent back to the supply dump which was 
probably “Leuce Acte” at the head of the Thermaic Gulf to reload and 
maintain an overland shuttle service through the winter (see map facing 
p.46). This 400 kilometre-long supply route was hazardous, the convoys 
being at risk of attack by guerrilla bands in Phokis.59 
  If this is a reasonable conclusion, the tonnages of grain as 
calculated above will serve for the three easternmost dumps, but the 
westernmost at “Leuce Acte” must have been many times bigger and 
continuously supplied right through the sailing season. Whatever the correct 
estimate of the amount of foodstuffs delivered to the Persian forces might 
be, it required a major long-term logistical effort to supply very large 
quantities of foodstuffs for men and animals to properly built granaries at   
carefully selected distribution points, and redistribute to the forces either as 
they marched or sailed past or keep them fed through the approaching 
winter. 
The source of cereals 
 The question then follows, where did the grain and fodder come 
from? Little if any could be supplied from Anatolia or overland from Asia. 
There were two possible sources, either Egypt, a long windward voyage 
away, or, much more likely, from the Black Sea littoral, where Persian 
influence was strong.  It must also be borne in mind that at that time there 
was already a well-developed grain trade between Athens and other 
Greek cities and the Black Sea wheat-lands, which must have come to a 
sudden end with the Persian crossing of the Hellespont.60 Herodotus relates 
how Xerxes allowed Greek grain ships sailing down the Hellespont to go  
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unmolested as they were doing a supply job for him.61 The Black Sea option 
would also have had the advantage of an easy down-wind passage direct 
to the coast of Thrace. 
Shipping the supplies 
The necessity of keeping the grain dry in granaries has already been 
mentioned, but the cargoes of cereals had to be kept dry during transport 
in the supply ships. An expert in ancient shipping asserts that grain was 
carried in sacks.62 The risk of spoilage must have been great and the 
possibility considered that grain could have been kept dry by transporting it 
in amphorae. The Athenians and other Greeks manufactured amphorae in 
which they exported wine and olive oil. Although no evidence has been 
found to suggest such a practice, the grain for which the wine and oil was 
traded could have been filled into the emptied amphorae for the return 
voyage. However, the supplies for the Persian army could not be delivered 
in amphorae unless there was a pottery industry in the Black Sea grain 
supplying areas to manufacture the very large numbers needed. 
Furthermore, no archaeological evidence has been found for amphorae, 
whole or fragmentary, at the sites of the dumps.  In any case, if amphorae 
were used, a considerable proportion of the carrying capacity of the ships 
would have been taken up with the mass of the containers. As the carrying 
of grain loose in the holds of the ships is doubtful, there remains only the 
possibility that the grain was carried in sacks of some sort. This in turn 
supposes the existence of a linen weaving industry on the Black Sea littoral, 
flax being a very widespread crop and probably cultivated in the wheat 
growing areas of the Black Sea. Such sacks would not have been 
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waterproof. The only likely alternative would have been the use of 
reasonably waterproof bags made from the whole hides of animals such as 
cattle or goats. Leather bags of this sort would have been durable and 
reusable, but needed in such large numbers that heavy and possibly 
unfulfillable demands would have been made on the relatively small cattle 
herds of peoples who were essentially cereal eaters. Roth however is of the 
opinion that grain was shipped loose, the cost and availability of leather 
bags precluding their use.63 Whichever method of transport was used, by 
the time the rations were issued to the army and navy, a proportion would 
have been mildewed or otherwise damaged and unpalatable. This is a 
possible explanation for Herodotus’ report that the part of the army 
returning to Asia with Xerxes had to live off the land. 
Persian doubts 
 Not all the Persian general staff agreed with the viability of the 
planned invasion. Herodotus tells us that Artabanus offered the king a lesson 
in logistics, saying in part:-64 
If you increase your forces the two powers I have in mind will be 
worse enemies to you than they are now….the land and the sea. There is 
not a harbour anywhere big enough (for) our fleet. If you meet with no 
opposition, the land itself will become more and more hostile…the mere 
distance will ultimately starve you. 
 
Xerxes must have been given some misleading information as he 
not only rejected Artabanus’ advice and that of Demaratus the deposed 
and refugee king of Sparta.65 The former was sent back to Susa after being 
told that the army would take plenty of supplies with it and in any case they 
would have plenty of grain as the countries they would pass through were 
occupied by agricultural peoples and not nomads. 
The Persian fleet. 
 Herodotus reports that the Persian army was supported by an 
enormous fleet of 1320 warships.66 Here again credulity is strained. The 
interesting suggestion has been made that Greek spies counted as part of 
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the fleet, the 674 ships being assembled for the bridges of boats across the 
Hellespont.67 If that number is subtracted there still remains a massive 
armada of 653 triremes plus about 2300 supply ships. Bury and Meiggs make 
a guess of “perhaps 800”.68 Hammond does not question Herodotus.69 
Strauss does not suggest a lower number but allows for its reduction to more 
believable proportions by accepting Herodotus’ probably invented storm 
and battle losses in order to arrive at a sensible number at Salamis.70 
For the purpose of this discussion a fleet of 653 triremes is 
accepted as a reasonable estimate while the remainder were used to 
support the bridge of boats. The Persian warships had a complement of 230 
which means there were about one hundred and fifty thousand crewmen 
who had to be supplied with food and water daily as little, if any, supplies 
were carried aboard the crowded warships. The navy was almost the same 
size as the army, but with this difference, that the fleet could not be 
supplied from the food dumps but had to find suitable beaches where the 
warships and the merchant ships supplying them, could go ashore every 
evening. The daily grain consumption of one trireme crew would have been 
about 315 kilograms and thus about 200 tons for the fleet. 
One expert claims that the carrying capacity of a merchantman 
of the time was about 70 to 80 tons, so that three could theoretically supply 
the fleet for one day.71  The nature of the coast is such that the fleet would 
have been strung out over a considerable distance looking for beaches 
where the ships could be hauled out and the crews fed and rested. It is 
assumed here that in order to ensure reliable food supplies to the crews, 
one merchant ship would have serviced two warships. Rounding up the 
numbers, 350 supply ships carrying twenty-six thousand two hundred tons of 
grain could supply the fleet for  130 days, which is a little longer than the 
time the fleet took to reach Phaleron after it assembled off Cape 
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Sarpedon.72 The difficulties in giving instructions to polyglot merchantmen 
supplying equally polyglot trireme crews can only be imagined. 
That is not all, once beyond the last of the food dumps and across 
the River Haliakmon, the army marched into mountainous country in which 
it certainly could not live off the land, so it too had to be supplied from the 
sea by about the same number of merchantmen, and twice as many again 
with grain and fodder for the horses. Herodotus’ figure of about two 
thousand three hundred supply ships is not as unlikely as it seems at first 
reading.73 The supply chain must have been severely strained, if indeed it 
sometimes failed altogether in trying to get supplies from beaches to the 
troops marching somewhere inland on the tracks which passed for roads in 
ancient Greece. 
Routing of the supply ships 
  Another intriguing aspect of the food supply effort is how the supply 
ships, coming down the Hellespont, were instructed where they had to go 
to unload.  It is a reasonable assumption that they would have called at 
Sestos or Abydos in the Hellespont, or, perhaps more likely, at the bridge of 
boats as they passed through it, to get delivery orders from a Persian official 
stationed there.  That official also needed to be informed himself, perhaps 
by the well-organised Persian courier service which Herodotus admired.74 It 
is perhaps more likely those instructions were delivered by a fast despatch 
boat, probably a penteconter, sent from the fleet as it moved southwards 
along the coast. If these are reasonable suppositions, then it must also be 
accepted that even quite junior Persian officers were literate. One can go 
further and suggest that without the use of written instructions, the whole 
enterprise would not have been possible. A further complication would 
have been the need for multilingual messages if Darius’ Behistun inscription 
is indicative of the nature of internal communications within the Persian 
Empire.  In view of the long presence of Greek commercial interests in the 
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Aegean and Black Seas, it is probable that the maritime lingua franca was 
Greek. 
Total cereal requirements for the campaign 
 To sum up, the delivery of cereal to the combined Persian forces, 
between the time the army left the Scamander about the first week in May, 
and the defeat of the navy at Salamis on or about September 25th, some 
140 days later, the combined forces of three hundred thousand men 
consumed fifty seven thousand five hundred tons of grain and their seventy 
five thousand pack animals a further forty seven thousand tons of cereal 
and a similar amount of fodder. The amount of cereals required for the 
combined army and navy for six months has been confirmed by an 
authority on Roman logistics whose estimate for a six-month Roman 
campaign gives a pro rata amount of forty nine thousand tons.75 These 
tonnages do not include the consumption of grain by personnel in the 
supply columns and the non-combatant camp followers, nor has the supply 
of vegetables such as onions and beans, or of salt, wine and so on, been 
considered. To these numbers must be added the food consumption of the 
army of occupation for almost a year in Greece between Salamis and 
Plataea. 
Herodotus calculated daily grain consumption for the combined 
forces and arrived at the very much greater amount of three thousand 
seven hundred and fifty tons per day.76 If this number is divided by the 5.28 
million men he claimed for the total Persian force then each man would 
have had an inadequate daily ration of about 600 grams of grain.77 No 
matter which number is nearest the actual amount, we have an indication 
of the magnitude of the grain-producing capabilities of the Black Sea 
littoral, and the Persian ability to move large tonnages of it to their forces in 
an operation lasting several years. We do not know whether the Persians 
paid their suppliers from their enormous reserves of darics, or simply 
appropriated what they needed.  The question then arises, who consumed 
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these huge amounts of grain before and after the period of the Persian 
demand for it?  It has been mentioned above that the population of Attica 
was of the same order of magnitude as the combined Persian forces. A 
likely assumption is that grain which should normally have been carried by 
the Athenian grain trade was diverted to the Persian dumps. If this was so, 
the Athenians either went short or had to supplement their supply from 
possibly Egypt via the Greek “treaty port” they founded at Naucratis in the 
Nile delta, or from Sicilian sources, for some three years before Xerxes’ 
actual invasion. The Athenian aristocracy scorned to take a direct part in 
trade, leaving grain importation entirely in the hands of private 
entrepreneurs many of them foreigners or metics.78 The merchants must 
have given the Athenians warning of the Persian appropriation of Black Sea 
wheat in preparation for the coming invasion. Furthermore, the Persians 
must surely have commandeered a large part of the merchant marine 
available in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean to carry cereals from 
the Black Sea to Thrace. This must have severely damaged maritime trade 
throughout the Levant. This could be seen as deliberate economic warfare 
on the part of the Persians rather than merely incidental to their planning. 
The bridges of boats 
 Turning now to the bridges of boats, Herodotus gives us quite a lot of 
information about what was a major feat of engineering, but frustratingly 
omits some important detail.  He does not tell us how long beforehand or 
where and how the 674 triremes needed for the two bridges of boats were 
obtained. An attractive suggestion has been made that some might have 
been old ones left over from the Marathon campaign of 490.79 Before the 
orders to build or acquire the ships could be given, the numbers which 
would be needed had to be calculated from accurate measurements of 
the width of the Hellespont at the identified crossing points. This immediately  
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raises another question, who did the surveying and by what method?  Likely 
candidates were the Egyptians, who from earliest times were skilled in 
surveying through annual necessity, would have been given the task.80 
 The steep and rocky shores of the Hellespont would have 
precluded estimating the width by the well-known ancient method of 
similar triangles.81 It is more likely that the width was measured physically by  
counting the number of times a long  rope of known length was  stretched 
from one shore to  a  manned ship which was anchored when the rope was 
taut. Then the shore end would be passed to a second ship which 
anchored broadside to the first when the rope was again taut, and 
repeating the process, the first ship moving to the far side of the second 
and so on, until the straight was crossed. At the same time the lengths of   
anchor cables could be determined, the average depth of the Hellespont 
being about 60 metres. 
The Trireme  
 In order to get an idea what the bridges of boats were like, and 
understand the nature of early fifth century marine warfare, it is necessary 
to describe the trireme. By the time of the Persian invasion it had been 
already about a century in development around the Eastern 
Mediterranean. The somewhat smaller, undecked penteconter, also 
mentioned by Herodotus, was of similar hull construction, but open and 
undecked. The trireme, with local variations, was the warship universally 
used by the eastern Mediterranean maritime powers (see attached 
illustration). The triremes of the Persian fleet, particularly those supplied by 
the Phoenicians, were in terms of their length, breadth and crew numbers, 
the biggest ships of their day. Their hulls could be easily adapted to serve as 
supports for the bridge of boats, by removing their light decking and the 
outriggers for the uppermost tier of oars. (See the attached illustration of the 
suggested arrangement). Their waterline length of some 32 metres and  
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beam of about 5 metres would allow for the widest possible bridges with the 
maximum load-carrying capacity. In their designed role as warships the 
Persian ships were built and crewed by Ionians, Phoenicians, Sidonians and 
Egyptians.  It is remarkable that although there was a total absence of ship-
building timber in Egypt itself, the Egyptians were able builders and sailors of 
triremes.  
The normal working load of a trireme would have been some 14-16 
tons. When afloat in calm water the lowest oar ports were about 30 
centimetres above the water-line.82 These ports were normally fitted with 
leather sleeves to keep out waves and oar-splash. The triremes assigned for 
supporting the bridge would presumably have had those ports permanently 
sealed as the hulls rode lower in the water due to the heavy load of the 
bridge cables, decking, men, animals and equipment crossing the bridge.  
The Persian engineers must have estimated the total mass of the ropes and 
decking and traffic each boat had to carry, and how much freeboard 
would remain. 
 Triremes were warships with no commercial use whatever and   
represented a peak in ancient “high-tech” ship-building achievement.  
They were very expensive to build and maintain in sea-going condition.  For 
example, each Athenian trireme cost a talent a month to maintain at sea 
when on active service.83 The Athenian ships were slightly smaller than those 
in the Persian fleet. They had a draft of 1.1 metres at 40 tons displacement.84 
As the trireme hull was very long in relation to its depth, it was liable to 
“hogging” that is, bending in the middle as it passed lengthwise over 
waves.  To minimise movement of the planks, which were butted together, 
they were held tightly by twenty thousand tenons locked in place by hard-
wood pegs cut to fine tolerances.85 The hull was stiffened by the 
hypozomata or undergirdles, two stout ropes, running the length of the ship 
and firmly attached to the bow and stern posts. The two ropes were twisted 
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together until tight and then tightened some more when the ship was 
afloat.   
Persian and Greek triremes alike, were powered by 170 oarsmen in 
three tiers, hence the name. When on passage, square-rigged sails were set 
to assist the oarsmen when the wind came from astern or on the quarter.  
When about to go into battle the trireme became a missile intended to ram 
the enemy, break as many oars as possible or sink the enemy ship, which, 
being of all-wooden construction, broke up, and the wreckage floated 
away.  It was usual before going into battle to take the mast, yards and sails 
ashore so that the crew and combatants were not impeded by 
obstructions on the decks. The crew on an Athenian deck was made up of 
ten each of officers, seamen and “marines” (epibatai).  The shallow draft of 
the ships made them so unstable that the marines were trained to throw 
their spears sitting down on the light deck which protected the oarsmen 
from the heat of the sun and gave some cover from enemy missiles. The 
bigger Persian ships had thirty soldiers aboard, usually archers who had the 
additional duty of keeping their eyes on the not always loyal crew.   
The poor sea-going abilities of the Athenian trireme of the day 
usually limited its operational  use to inshore waters and most  sea battles 
were fought  close to land and indeed, sometimes  ashore, such as at the 
Athenian disaster at Aigospotami. There was no room in the crowded hulls 
for  more than very limited supplies of food and water, hence it was usual, 
but not the rule, for the warships to be at sea  during the daylight hours and  
then only  in relatively calm conditions, coming ashore in the evening for 
food and water and overnight rest. As will be seen below these limitations 
were important factors which were either neglected or taken as an 
acceptable risk by the Persian planners.   
As water-proofing of the hulls was primitive or totally lacking, the 
working life of a trireme was about twenty years if not lost in battle.  In that  
time it  deteriorated from a “fast” battleship and after about ten years  had 
become a “slow” one as the hull absorbed water and was attacked by the 
damaging  teredon or “ship-worm” (which  made holes in the planking), 
and  attracted marine growth.  When too slow for battle it would be 
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downgraded to a trooper, one tier of oarsmen being taken out to 
accommodate about eighty soldiers. If it lasted long enough, the old ship 
finally became a horse transport with a further reduction in oarsmen, before 
being abandoned and left to rot on a beach. 
The papyrus and flax cables 
 The Persian army was well on its way from Sardis to the completed 
bridges when a storm broke them up. The job was done again with stronger 
cables to hold the ships together. Presumably most of the hulls were 
recovered and the relatively few damaged ones replaced. Herodotus was 
told that the ships which carried the bridges supported six cables, two of 
flax and four of papyrus, each seven stadia, or about a kilometre long. He 
was quite right about the width of the Hellespont at its narrowest being 
seven stadia, or about a kilometre, but he did not know that there are no 
beaches on either side at that point.  Maurice found that the nearest sites 
with beaches on both shores opposite each other are some seven 
kilometres to the north, where the channel has a deep embayment on the 
Chersonese side making it a lot wider. With the aid of a British army map, 
probably compiled during the Gallipoli campaign of 1915, Maurice showed 
that at the most likely crossing points, the bridges would have been 3.87 
and 3.39 kilometres long respectively.86 These distances compare very well 
with the distance occupied by the 360 triremes for the longer and 314 for 
the shorter bridge as reported by Herodotus, multiplied by their beam of 5.5 
metres and 5 metres apart which gives 3.78 and 3.30 kilometres 
respectively. However, it is necessary to add a caveat. Hammond and 
Roseman have noted that since the publication of Maurice’s paper, 
geological research has shown that the level of the Aegean Sea was 1.5 
metres lower in antiquity. They also quote the “Black Sea Pilot” which warns 
that “a shallow bank extends over half-a-mile offshore in some places”, and 
add the observation that Maurice (a soldier) did not take the counter-
currents in the Hellespont into account in his placing of the bridge sites.87  If 
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their view is correct, then the 360 and 314 triremes and pentekonters 
supporting the bridges would have been touching each other across the 
width of the Hellespont at its narrowest point. The assembling of the boats 
and anchoring them in place would have required a large number of skilled 
sailors, probably fishermen recruited from ports up and down the Hellespont 
which was famous for its tunny fisheries. Herodotus notes that especially 
heavy anchors were used, one thousand three hundred and seventy eight 
large blocks of stone!88  
  The manufacture and installation of the cables was a major 
logistical problem. The only source of papyrus was Egypt. Herodotus 
reported that the cables weighed a talent per cubit which gives a diameter 
of 25 centimetres with a breaking strain of about sixty-six tons.89 It is unlikely 
that the Egyptian craftsmen had ever before made cables more than a 
quarter of the diameter of those required for the bridges. They would have 
had to learn a new technique on site, of laying so many more strands of 
yarn together. It is not surprising that the cables on the original bridge broke 
in a storm. It would seem that the Persian desire to overawe their enemies 
extended to the making of enormous cables when eight times as many, 
that is, forty-eight cables, with a diameter of 9 centimetres would have 
been easy to handle and of equal combined strength.  
  If Maurice’s proposed siting of the bridges is correct, each cable 
weighed about 175 tons for the longer bridge and 153 tons for the shorter 
one, i.e. a total of over 1300 tons of papyrus cable plus about 650 tons of 
flax needed for the other two cables. About half this tonnage would have 
been required for the shorter crossing. Thus, each trireme supported 3 tons 
of cable. We do not know whether the planners had the cables woven in 
Egypt and sent to the Hellespont by cargo ship (a long and slow windward 
voyage of at least 1200 kilometres) or  alternatively,  sent the raw papyrus 
and Egyptian craftsmen to weave the cables on site. Herodotus does give 
a clue. He relates that:- 
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…a Persian named Oeobazus, (who) came from Cardia, where he 
had stored the cables used in the construction of the bridges.90 
  As the word “stored” is used it is more likely that woven cables, 
whole or more probably, in lengths to be spliced together, were shipped 
from Egypt. Whichever way it was done, the cables still had to be 
transported over some 50 kilometres of difficult country, or 200 kilometres by 
sea from Cardia at the head of the Gulf of Melas (see  map, page p 38) to 
the planned beach-head. Hammond and Roseman take the other view 
and suggest that raw papyrus was transported from Egypt to the site and 
the cables woven in complete lengths of 1700 metres, the Egyptian rope-
makers moving their equipment from one supporting trireme to the next.91 
Whichever method was used, a large number of Egyptian rope-makers had 
to be imported and housed and fed. The need to supply them might have 
been the reason why ready-milled grain was sent from the Asiatic shore not 
only to the canal workers at Athos, but could also have been supplied to 
the bridge workers as well.  
 As has been noted above, flax was a common crop in the Middle 
East so that the weaving of flax ropes could be done much closer to the site 
and sources of the fibre not such a problem by comparison. It can only be  
conjectured how  the six  massive cables were laid  from ship to ship across 
the width of the Hellespont to hold the bridge together and provide a base 
for the roadway, (which would have been about 20 metres wide) laid over  
them. One historian who had not seen the site, and obviously was no 
seaman, speculated that the bridges were at the narrowest point of the 
Hellespont, and the cables floated down to the boats and hoisted 
aboard.92 This would not have been possible as the cables would have 
fouled the anchor cables and become unmanageable in the 10 kilometres 
per hour current.93   
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It seems more likely that as the cables were probably woven in 
Egypt and shipped in convenient lengths to fit into the holds of the cargo 
ships and then spliced together on the bridge of boats by Egyptian experts.  
Herodotus relates that the cables, once laid across bridge of boats, were 
“hauled taut by winches ashore”. He adds that after the installation of the 
ropes across the moored triremes, a roadway was laid by means of planks 
the length of the ships, laid edge to edge and lashed to the ropes. 
Brushwood was laid on the planks and then a layer of tamped down earth 
and finally a screen on each side so that the transport animals were not 
frightened at the sight of water.94 This was a massive task in itself. The 
Chersonese and the Asian shores are largely rocky and treeless, the nearest 
forests being in Thrace across the Gulf of Melas.  Assuming that it would 
have been easier to cut straight pine or fir trees 20 metres long and 20 
centimetres diameter, then some thirty five thousand trees would have 
been required. The felled trees would then have had to be lashed together 
in rafts and towed across Gulf to the bridges. Brushwood was probably easy 
to find, and the soil used was likely to have been beach sand. 
Passing ships through the bridges   
Herodotus reports, without explanation, that three gaps were left 
in the bridges to allow vessels to pass through.95 This must surely mean ship 
passages were constructed at both the shoreward ends of one bridge 
(probably the upstream one) and one gap probably at the Chersonese 
end of the other. One can only speculate how this was done. All types of 
sailing ships of the time had masts which could be easily unstepped. A 
passing cargo ship would have needed headroom of two metres at the 
most with its mast unstepped in order to pass under the bridge cables. With 
that in mind, it is suggested that the simplest solution to the problem would 
have been for four triremes on each side of each “gap”, that is, 24 
altogether, to have been modified by fitting baulks about twenty metres 
long lengthwise, raised by 25, 50, and 75 centimetres and one metre 
successively above the deck level, to lift the road over the cables by a 
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gentle slope to about 2 metres above water level which would have been 
sufficient for a merchant ship to pass underneath.  (See illustration of a 
possible arrangement, p 27) 
The operational life of the bridges 
 It can be reasonably assumed that the Persian planners expected  
the  bridges of boats to remain serviceable long enough to be recrossed by 
most of the army returning to Asia after an expected rapid conquest of 
Greece.  Such expectations were not realised. The Battle of Salamis was 
fought about September 25th and Xerxes left the scene shortly afterwards  
reaching the  probably unusable bridges  45 days later, that is about 
November 5th, well into the  stormy winter season.96 The possibility of the 
bridges surviving the winter was remote.  A modern author says that after a 
severe winter the narrowest part of the Hellespont is blocked with drifting 
ice-floes. Had the winter of 480-79 been a cold one, ice-floes would have 
ensured the destruction of the bridge.97 
It has already been mentioned that the water-proofing of the 
trireme hull was primitive so that triremes with more than ten years service 
and no longer battle-worthy, would have been ideal for supporting the 
bridges of boats. Those assigned to support the bridges had to be sailed to 
suitable beaches along the Hellespont within easy reach of the intended 
crossing points. Once there, the light decks and outriggers would have 
been removed in preparation for their role as supports for the bridges. They 
would then have been moved to beaches as close to the site as possible 
until the Persian engineers were ready to build the bridges.  As triremes were 
built for acceleration and speed, they were not protected below the 
waterline by a thin sheet of lead as were cargo ships.98 The lack of 
waterproofing meant that the warships had to be beached and allowed to 
dry out at every possible opportunity to minimise the uptake of water by the 
timbers.  Although Homer uses the epithet “black” implying that ships were 
waterproofed with pitch or bitumen, there is no evidence for this practice in 
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either Greece or elsewhere in the fifth and fourth centuries.99 During the 
winter months, triremes were sheltered in boat sheds to keep them dry. If 
the supposition is correct that the ten-years and older survivors from the 
Marathon campaign might have been used to support the bridges, they 
would have already become partially waterlogged and leaky before 
construction of the bridges had started. Their remaining life-span whilst 
permanently in the water would have been greatly reduced and an 
important factor in the useful life of the bridges. The planners must have 
realised that the bridges would not have lasted more than a few months, 
even without possible storm damage or use. If the army was to recross the 
bridges into Asia, a quick victory was essential. 
  After the battle of Mycale which took place the following summer, 
the Greeks sailed to the Hellespont to destroy the bridges and found them 
already broken up.100 This is hardly surprising, as the already partially 
waterlogged ships left permanently afloat supporting the bridges, would 
have deteriorated very rapidly.  The short life of a trireme when not regularly 
dried out, is vividly illustrated in a  letter written some 65 years later by the 
Athenian general Nicias  besieging  Syracuse,  in which he says inter alia:-101 
…our fleet was originally in first-class condition; the timbers were 
sound….Now however the ships have been at sea so long that the timbers 
have rotted…  
 
Why a bridge of boats? 
Why did the Persians go to the extraordinary trouble of building the 
bridges of boats, particularly if their experts had made them aware that the 
useful life of old triremes continuously afloat could be measured in months 
at best?  As an alternative strategy they could have used some of the ships 
that had been assigned for the bridge, to ferry the troops across to Thrace. 
The Persian equivalent of a general staff had a good knowledge of the 
geography of the Hellespont and must have done their arithmetic. They 
knew that a trooper trireme could carry 85 soldiers and possibly cram in 100 
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men for the short trip of 4 kilometres.102 That meant making 1 550 round trips 
which had to be completed in seven days, which required 220 trips per day. 
As the current in the Hellespont is very strong, an estimate of four hours per 
round trip, and 10 hours of daylight would allow two and a half trips per day 
which demands 88 trooper triremes and almost nine thousand men to row 
them. As the beaches were not wide enough to accommodate so many 
triremes only a few ships could be beached at the same time. If the 
transhipment of the army took any longer than seven days there would  be 
a serious food and water problem both for the troops  waiting to cross and 
those the other side.  Additional time would have been required to ship the 
horses, mules and camels, if indeed they could be persuaded to get 
aboard ships. 
An alternative possibility would have been to march to the 
narrowest point on the Bosporus which is only 750 metres wide where boats 
or even large rafts would serve instead of a bridge. This solution would entail 
another 700 kilometre march to the Bosporus and then back down the 
coast of Thrace, which would take more than a month with massive 
additional supply problems and the very real possibility of the whole army 
having to over-winter in Greece. 
If pack animals could be loaded on to transports, the army could 
be ferried straight across the sea from the Scamander or other Troad ports, 
to the friendly shores of the Thracian coast.  An objection to this would be 
that the transports would be easy pickings for Greek warships, and in any 
case Artabazus had pointed out that there are no suitable ports in the 
Troad.103  Therefore a bridge would have to be built.  Maurice concluded 
that a bridge was the only possible military solution, but a modern historian 
believes that, like the Athos canal, the bridge was built as much for prestige 
and a show of strength as for its functional role.104 If the Persians, much 
against their nature, had been content with an invasion force a third of the 
size, (which would have still been much bigger than the combined Greek 
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forces), shipping of the troops across to Thracian landing points would 
probably have been an attractive solution.105 
Availability of water 
 Consideration must now be given to the most difficult logistical 
problem faced by the invaders. Herodotus mentions it several times, and 
Maurice keeps returning to it – the supply of water. It must be borne in mind 
that the army consisted not only of men but also a very large number of 
pack animals, both horse, mules and camels, which needed large volumes 
of water. The river Scamander was the last water source on the Asian side of 
the Hellespont able to support the needs of the army and its animals. It was 
at this point that Xerxes was faced with a serious and unexpected problem 
when a storm broke up the bridge. We do not know how long it took to 
repair the bridge. Even if the damage was easily repaired, a few days delay 
must have seriously upset the timetable. No wonder Xerxes lost his temper 
and had the Hellespont whipped and branded with red-hot irons.106  Whilst 
waiting for the bridge to be repaired, the army and its baggage train still 
had to be fed, using up supplies which had not been planned for, thus 
compromising stocks intended for later use. Furthermore, the season was 
advancing and rivers and streams were drying up. To give some idea of the 
problem, Maurice points out that General Allenby’s army of fifty-six 
thousand men and twenty-six thousand pack animals, (an army a third of 
the size of the Persians’) at the battle of Gaza - Beersheba in 1917 used a 
minimum of 1.6 million litres of water a day which is about the same as the 
contents of a municipal swimming pool.107 
The Persians were thoroughly familiar with the geography of the 
Chersonese, being able to call on the knowledge of local fishermen, and 
merchants who had plied between Asia and Europe for many generations. 
Hence they could plan a route from the Scamander to the Hebrus River, 
which was the next reliable source of water (at the top left of the map on 
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the facing page). The 220 kilometres from river to river had to be completed 
in seven marches, with very limited water available along the way. 
  It is an inescapable fact of equine life that ridden or loaded 
horses and pack animals cannot travel more than seven consecutive days  
without a rest day otherwise their backs are damaged.108 A rest day uses up 
as much food and water as a marching day, so no more than seven 
marches between river and river was essential. Food was not a problem as 
there was a food dump and a good beach for supply ships at a location 
Maurice thought to be Herodotus’ Leuce Acte at the head of the Gulf of 
Melas where water was also available from the nearby perennial river 
Melas. 
Crossing the Hellespont 
  There is some doubt about the month of the year that the army 
crossed the Hellespont. Herodotus mentions an eclipse of the sun at that 
time; unfortunately, he got it wrong. Maurice suggests that the likely date 
on which the Persians commenced their march from Sardis to the 
Scamander was May 7th with the army crossing of the bridge of boats 
between May 12th and 16th..109 Strauss suggests a date in June which was 
well into the dry summer season. The first day’s march of the leading 
troops, which Herodotus says were the ten thousand “Immortals”, would 
probably have been from the Scamander to a small river at Abydos, near 
the eastern end of the bridge at point 1 on the map.110 
Two bridges were a military necessity because the narrow tracks in 
the Chersonese required that the supply column, unusually, had to march in 
parallel with the troops. The route lay more or less northwards up the 
Chersonese along a narrow defile in the mountainous peninsula, wide 
enough for two men marching abreast with a file of transport animals 
beside them. As the army was marching in friendly country it was not 
necessary to take up defensive positions, but simply bivouac where they 
halted. Maurice suggests that the “Ten Thousand” started marching at 5 am 
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on the first morning and marched for 8 hours, the head of the column 
reaching point 2 on the now dry River Aigospotami. The tail of the column 
would then be about 24 kilometres beyond the bridges. After a bivouac of 
ten hours the column would recommence its march. Meanwhile, the next 
division of twenty thousand men had commenced marching at 5 pm from 
point 2 and by 11 pm would be closing up on the tail of the “Immortals” and 
follow behind for two hours until it too stopped for a ten hour bivouac. The 
next column would start over the bridge at 7 am the third day and so on 
until completed on the sixth day. Herodotus was correct in saying that it 
took seven days and nights for the army to cross the bridge, but it was not a 
continuous process but a progression rather like a centipede. Herodotus 
reports that the army was “under the lash” crossing the bridge.  Maurice 
says that the ground rises steeply from the beaches and a natural tendency 
for men and animals to slow down on the steep climb to level ground   
would have led to crowding on the bridge, so men and animals were urged 
to move smartly with the whip.111  Referring to the map, the two marches 
from the watering point numbered 4 on the River Melas to point 6 at Aenas 
was also along a narrow defile, and being waterless along its whole length 
was particularly trying for the pack animals. According to this schedule the 
first troops would have reached Doriscus on the Hebrus, as the last 
contingent was leaving the bridge.  Thus it would have taken two weeks 
after the first troops left the Scamander for the whole army to assemble at 
Doriscus. Herodotus’ report on the method of numbering the army when it 
reached Doriscus is generally thought to be one of the silly stories he 
accepted without question.  However Maurice points out that the march 
from Aenas at point 6 to Doriscus at 7  was a short one in open well-watered 
country, where each column as it arrived on open ground between the 
Hebrus and Lake Stentoris would bivouac and then move further up the 
valley to make room for the next column coming up behind. This would 
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explain Herodotus’ story of the numbering in an enclosure.112 
The size of the Persian army 
 Maurice explains how he arrived at the size of the Persian army by 
calculating the flow of the Scamander using a formula (which he does not 
disclose) “commonly used in military reconnaissance”.113 By this method he 
estimated a total of about one hundred and fifty thousand combatants 
and sixty thousand non-combatants and seventy-five thousand pack 
animals. He broke this down into ten thousand five hundred cavalry, one 
hundred and twenty thousand infantry, ten thousand “Immortals” and ten 
thousand in Xerxes’ personal escort and “G.H.Q. troops”. This can be 
checked another way which he does not mention. Maurice had walked 
the full length of the route and established that except where it crossed the 
R. Melas it was almost all in narrow valleys where only two men could march 
abreast with the supply column parallel to them.  The distance from the 
Scamander to the Hebrus is 220 kilometres and according to his marching 
programme, would be completely occupied when the head of the column 
reached the Hebrus.  Marching along a rough track each pair of men 
would be about 2 metres apart. Therefore the total number of combatants 
plus non-combatant transport personnel would be approximately 
(220x1000x2)/2 which is two hundred and twenty thousand, a figure 
comparing very well with Maurice’s estimate of two hundred and ten 
thousand. If that number crossed the Hellespont, only about one hundred 
and seventy five thousand actually reached Attica. Gabriel and Metz point 
out that an ancient army on the march was a “medical disaster” with losses 
in excess of 20% due to exhaustion and routine injuries, together with a 
steady decline in resistance to disease.114 The navy too would have suffered 
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similar losses, a fact of military life so common-place as not requiring 
comment. 
Marching discipline 
 There are other aspects of armies marching in long columns which 
present logistical problems. Consider the ten thousand “Immortals” 
marching on a rough track two by two. As mentioned previously, each pair 
will be about 2 metres apart so that the five thousand pairs of the column 
will stretch a distance of ten kilometres! How were orders passed down the 
column?  In another study of military logistics Engels points out that when a 
column is given the order to march, there is a slight hesitation before the 
second file moves and then the third, and so on.115 If that slight pause is only 
one second, the last file of the five thousand will start marching one hour 
and twenty two minutes after the order is given! We see this phenomenon 
today how a row of cars starts moving when the lights change to green. It is 
clear that a strict march discipline was essential in getting the army of one 
hundred and fifty thousand men, split into seven sections to move 
according to plan.  This possibly explains the use of whips. 
Beaching and mooring the fleet overnight 
 When the army arrived at Doriscus, the supply problems did not end 
there. Most, but not all, of the beaches on the rocky coast of Thrace were 
small ones, which meant that the huge Persian fleet could not be beached 
at the same place for the night. Herodotus says that at the beach between 
Casthanaea and the Sepiad headland the warships were anchored off 
shore in lines eight deep with their bows pointing out to sea.116 This method 
of “Mediterranean mooring” with ships up to eight rows deep (prokrassai) 
maximises the number of ships which can be moored in a small harbour or 
off a restricted beach, was well-known. It requires the innermost row of ships 
to be beached stern-first. This was necessary because the triremes’ rams 
were below the water-line in front of the bows of the ships. If they came 
ashore bows-first, the rams dug into the beach which prevented them 
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being hauled ashore. The ships unable to find a space on the beach were 
moored with their sterns towards the shore, with their mooring-lines secured 
to the bows of the ships left and right of them in the next row nearer the 
shore. Their bow anchors were streamed seawards to hold the ships bows-
on to the sea. This process was repeated so that each row contained one 
ship less than the next shoreward row. The ships had to be moored close 
enough to each other for their boarding-ladders to be laid from ship to ship, 
stern to bow, so that the crews could get ashore. (See drawing of the 
arrangement on opposite page). By using this method a fleet of 132 ships 
could be moored off a beach only 300 metres long, which would otherwise 
have room for only twenty, hauled ashore fifteen metres apart. This mooring 
arrangement means that (in this theoretical example) food, water, firewood 
and shelter had to be available for more than twenty-six thousand men. 
Allowing ten square metres of beach per man, for bivouac space, supplies, 
fires and so on, the crews would occupy an area 300 metres along the 
beach and about 900 metres inland from it. Each of the crews would have 
had to bivouac together, with those of the outermost ships nearest to the 
shore. This arrangement needed skilful seamanship and strict discipline both 
afloat and ashore. The next morning, the crews of the outermost row of 
triremes would have been the first to go aboard by scrambling from ship to 
ship of the inner rows, followed by the crews of the next outermost row, and 
so on, in order that the fleet could get to sea as quickly as possible, already 
in formation, without confusion or a clash of oars. 
  It would seem that the Persians deliberately did not use the full 
length of the beach on the occasion mentioned by Herodotus in order to 
make a disciplined fleet manoeuvre the next morning.117 The gale which 
unexpectedly blew up overnight, drove a large part of the moored fleet 
ashore with disastrous consequences. 
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Supplies beyond the last food dump 
Artabanus’ warning to Xerxes that the further one went away from 
home, the more an enemy the land became, was fully justified. Despite 
Xerxes’ optimism, the Persians knew very well that Greece was “the 
handmaid of want” and it would not be possible for the army to live off the 
land.  The supply of grain and fodder from ships sailing down the coast had 
to operate effectively as the army marched the 400 kilometres or so 
beyond the last food dump, adding its requirements to those of the  fleet 
moving down the coast parallel to it. The task of supplying both the army of 
about one hundred and fifty thousand as it marched through Greece into 
Attica, and the fleet with much the same number of crewmen, with a 
combined daily need of some 370 tons of grain which had to come from 
the accompanying supply ships, must have strained the commissariat to the 
limit. The battles of Thermopylae and Artemisium were unexpected three-
day delays. What is more, Xerxes gave the sailors three days to view the 
battlefield at Thermopylae, which, whilst resting them, meant more 
unplanned consumption of supplies. There was another unexpected hold-
up for the Persian fleet, when sailing down the sheltered waters between 
Euboeia and the mainland. Surprisingly, they were ignorant of the 35 metre-
wide passage of the Euripus half-way down the strait. Two triremes rowing 
abreast through the passage every five minutes, for twelve daylight hours 
and then followed by the supply-ships, would have resulted in further delay 
of at least three more long days for the oarsmen on their rowing benches. 
This would have imposed more strain on a faltering supply system. Getting 
supplies of food and fuel not only to the army, but to the crews of the 
triremes beached overnight along a considerable distance of coastline on 
both sides of the strait, could have partially failed. 
Conditions aboard  the  warships 
 
 The Persian fleet was at sea for some four months from the time it 
assembled off Cape Sarpedon in Thrace to its arrival at Phaleron.  Unlike the 
army, the navy did not carry tents aboard the warships so that the trireme 
crews had to improvise overnight shelter ashore, whatever the weather. 
There must have been a loss of efficiency as illness took its toll. Furthermore, 
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during the movement of the invading fleet southwards in the three weeks 
before Salamis, there was little opportunity for the Persians to beach, clean 
and dry out their ships, last done after its arrival at Doriscus.118 It was a fact 
of trireme life that there were no sanitary arrangements in the crowded 
hulls. The oarsmen performed their bodily functions where they sat.  The 
Greek dramatist Aristophanes, who possibly pulled an oar himself, wrote:- 119 
The orders they get from their captains and yet, 
when I was alive, I protest that the knaves 
Knew nothing at all, save for rations to call, 
And to sing “rhyppapae” as they pulled through the waves. 
And bedad to let fly from their sterns in the eye  
Of the fellow who tugged at the undermost oar 
And  a  jolly  messmate with filth to besmirch.   
After a few days at sea, without the normal daily practice of  
beaching, cleaning and  drying out, the Persian triremes must have 
resembled floating cess-pits. The crews working in unbearable conditions 
would have been in a sorry state by the time they brought their ships to the 
shore of the curving seven kilometre-long beach of their planned base at 
Phaleron.  On that beach there had to be sufficient food and water for one 
hundred and fifty thousand men, and the kindling for thousands of fires to 
cook their meals during the interval of seven to ten days before the battle 
of Salamis.120  What is more, the army now around Athens also had to be 
supplied, possibly from the same beach.  The Persian command could not 
be blamed if the system buckled under the strain. 
Wasted effort 
 A significant part of the Persian logistical effort was dissipated by the  
amount of wasteful man and animal power used to maintain the 
ostentatious and luxurious life-style of the king and his  nobles, generals and 
advisers. The daily erection and dismantling of the king’s mobile palace 
must have seriously slowed down the Persian advance. This is confirmed by 
Xerxes’ retreat to the Hellespont taking about 45 days compared with the  
approximately 120  marching days from Doriscus to Attica. Herodotus 
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relates that on his retreat from Greece, Xerxes left his gorgeously decorated 
tent with Mardonius, the general in command of the “army of occupation”. 
Pausanias captured the tent after Plataea and ordered the attendant 
bakers to make a sumptuous meal which was served on gold tables with 
gold dishes. The Spartan general then summoned his officers to see what 
the Persians had brought to Greece to “rob them of their poverty.”121 
Greek logistics 
 Herodotus makes no mention of the logistical arrangements for the 
Greek fleet for the simple reason that probably there were none. Trireme 
crews - the unruly “nautikos oklos”- were paid a daily rate and expected to 
find their own sustenance. Supplies often came from merchants who 
followed the army or navy, trading for their own benefit.122 The supply 
situation of the Greeks must have been just as precarious, if not more so  
than that of the Persians. There had been only a few weeks in which to 
stock  Salamis with food and water and the island was crowded with some 
forty thousand trireme oarsmen and deck-crews, the eight thousand 
Athenian and allied hoplites, and an unknown number of refugees from 
Athens.123 However they did have the tactical advantage that everyone 
spoke the same language compared with the Persian generals transmitting 
orders to their multilingual and multicultural subordinates of their combined 
fleet at Phaleron. 
Persian morale before Salamis 
 Herodotus relates, in a probably biased account, that Xerxes and his 
advisers, who probably had never been involved in a set-piece sea battle, 
ignored the advice of the maritime Carian queen Artemisia who was 
commander of a small allied fleet.124 Despite her warnings, the Persian fleet 
which had been at sea most of a hot summer’s day, was ordered to re-
embark in the evening, probably before the crews had had time to find 
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water to drink or prepare their meals.125 Consequently, the fleet was at sea 
all the night before the battle. A likely contributory factor to the Persian 
defeat was that after a long spell afloat after Artemisium, the Persian 
trireme crews went into battle the next day in filthy conditions already tired, 
cold, certainly thirsty, and probably unfed.  Furthermore, the oarsmen, even 
if free men, were regarded as slaves by their Persian overlords, who had no 
concern whatever for their welfare or morale. On the other hand the 
majority of the Greek crews were free citizens. With their backs to the wall, a 
major part of the Greek crews had nothing left to lose except their freedom, 
whilst the slave component, if any, might have expected their freedom in 
the event of victory, a possible precedent for the Athenian use of slave 
oarsmen at the battle of Arginusae  sixty-nine years later.126 
The Persians lost the battle of Salamis, but they had not lost the 
war. Herodotus reports that Mardonius being a soldier, advised Xerxes not to 
take it too much to heart, and go home; after all, what were a few planks 
and timbers?127 The loss of tens of thousands of slave oarsmen was, to him, 
of no account. Indeed it is quite likely that with the enormous man-power of 
their empire to call on, the Persians regarded the navy campaigning on 
their behalf, as expendable. Xerxes would have been accompanied by his 
elite bodyguard and some or all of the “Immortals” on his march back to 
the Hellespont. As Herodotus says nothing about arrangements to get the 
army back into Asia, or at least, to occupied Thrace, the argument of 
silence can perhaps be invoked to assume that apart from those assigned 
to an army of occupation there was no concern about the fate of the rest. 
Like the oarsmen at Salamis, they were expendable. 
The Persian army still occupied Greece with the exception of the  
Peloponnese. If the calculations made above are approximately correct 
there were still sufficient food stocks remaining to continue operating for a 
few weeks before going into winter quarters.  Authorities agree that Xerxes’ 
acceptance of Mardonius’ advice to return to Asia was a correct one both 
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politically and militarily.128 As he had burned Athens to the ground, he could 
satisfy his own conscience by returning home having got his revenge for 
Marathon and the burning of Sardis.  Herodotus claims that three hundred 
thousand men remained in Attica under Mardonius’ command.129 From a 
logistical point of view, and bearing in mind his original estimate of the size 
of the Persian army, that figure is much too high. The task of maintaining an 
army of that size, a number much the same as the total population of 
peninsular Greece would have been a near impossibility. One estimate of 
the citizen and slave population of Athens, admittedly nearly a century 
later, was no more than one hundred and forty-four thousand.130 It seems 
much more likely that the Persian commissariat would have had to feed an 
army of perhaps seventy-five to one hundred thousand through the winter 
of 480-79.131 In any case a considerable part of the Persian army had 
returned to Asia through Greece and Thrace.  By retiring into Thessaly for the 
winter months, Mardonius almost halved the length of his supply line into 
Greece from the dump at the head of the Thermaic Gulf. As Thessaly was 
horse-rearing country, there would have been grazing enough to reduce 
the amount of forage for his cavalry to be transported to him. He was 
successful in keeping his army in Thessaly fed and fit throughout that winter. 
In one respect he was fortunate that the defeat and withdrawal of the fleet 
would have unexpectedly left food stocks which could be taken by his 
army as it retreated inland. Ten months later he returned to Athens and 
completely destroyed the city. 
 Mardonius’ supply line into Greece 
Mardonius’  subsequent retreat after the destruction of Athens was 
probably motivated not only by the threat of attack from a combined 
Greek army but also to considerably shorten his  extended and vulnerable   
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supply route from the Thermaic Gulf (see map). Furthermore, by 
retreating  into Thessaly  he could choose a battlefield  on which he could 
use his cavalry. As he advanced again into Attica, the next spring, his 
supply line lengthened with it. It is not likely that ship-borne supplies could 
reach his army which was now well inland. Using the suggested maximum of 
one hundred thousand combatants and the daily human requirements of 
cereals quoted above, the army would have required about 140 tons of 
grain a day. Assuming that very little could be obtained locally this tonnage 
had to be delivered by trains of pack animals from the Thermaic Gulf up to 
two weeks’ journey away in his rear, at the rate of travel of pack animals. If 
the average pack animal could carry 200 kilograms, then the daily arrival of 
long supply trains amounting to some seven hundred animals would have 
been needed. Such numbers would soon use up grazing around the army’s 
camps. It must also be borne in mind that the unloaded beasts had to 
return to the base on the Thermaic Gulf. Congestion on the narrow tracks 
would have impeded the convoys moving in opposite directions. Thus, it 
can be seen that keeping Mardonius supplied through the winter was a 
massive and successful logistical effort, despite interference from guerrillas 
en route. Keeping the army healthy was another problem. Bearing in mind 
the primitive hygienic arrangements of the time, an encampment housing 
about one hundred thousand men and twenty thousand animals would 
have been as unbearable as the interior of a trireme after a few days’ 
occupation. Mardonius probably took into account a substantial attrition of 
his forces by disease during their months in winter quarters. 
Greek logistics before Plataea 
 By the time Mardonius had marched southwards to face the Greek 
forces at Plataea, his much-lengthened supply-line would have become 
increasingly unreliable. The Persian base at Phaleron had been reoccupied 
by the Greeks and the short supply route from the coast denied him.  
However, the oncoming Greeks could have been in no better shape. The 
Spartan army was the only full-time, “professional” force in Greece, and the 
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only one which had a properly organised supply train.132  Their allies’ forces 
consisted of hoplites who were part-time gentleman soldiers who, when 
called up, took  slaves with them to carry their armour and  three, five, or 
seven days’ supply of food, depending on circumstances.133 When those 
supplies were exhausted they had to rely on merchants who either 
accompanied the march of the army, or followed soon after.134 To 
complicate matters, the soldiers had to be regularly paid so that they could 
buy supplies from the merchants who accompanied the army. In his 
assessment of the battle, Burn speculates just how little the Greeks had left 
to eat.135   
In view of the logistical difficulties for both sides, it is remarkable that 
the opposing armies delayed so long before engaging. Herodotus relates  
how Mardonius sent his cavalry  into a pass over  Cithaeron  where they 
destroyed and captured a Spartan train of 500 mules carrying supplies.136 
The survivors were driven back to the Persian lines where the contents were 
probably as badly needed by the Persians as they were by the Greeks.  The 
battle of Plataea has a strong parallel with the fleet action at Salamis. The 
army had already passed two winters away from home and a third one was 
approaching. Their supply situation was precarious and confronted by an 
unexpectedly large coalition of Greek forces, their morale must have been 
affected.137 Similarly, as Artemesia objected to Persian strategy before 
Salamis, the nobleman Artabasus disapproved of Mardonius’ plans and a 
Persian defeat was assured when, on the death of his superior officer, 
Artabasus quit the battlefield with his considerable force.138 
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Conclusion 
  The Persians were the rulers of an empire which was enormous by 
the standards of the time, with immense monetary and human resources. 
With these went a remarkable confidence in their ability to overcome 
physical obstacles, by excavating a canal of a size which would give pause 
to modern civil engineers. They threw not one bridge but two across a 
major water barrier, and supplied their army with huge tonnages of food 
from distant sources. One gets the impression that the army and navy were 
regarded as expendable in a venture mounted without any thought of 
profit, only a desire for revenge. A comparable modern equivalent would 
be the immense deployment of American resources in a national effort to 
put a man on the moon before the Russians could do it.  
         The Persians came close to succeeding, with an incredibly difficult   
logistical exercise, planned over at least four years. Their timetable was 
disrupted by the bridge of boats being broken in a storm. They were then  
held up for three days by Leonidas at Thermopylae, and unwisely allowed  
the loss of another three days for viewing the battlefield.  Their advance into 
Greece was slowed by the daily erection and dismantling of the king’s 
luxurious tent. The fleet sustained heavy losses by storm off Euboea and then 
delayed by ignorance of the narrows of the Euripus which checked their 
move south. The sum of these setbacks meant that the Persians arrived at 
their objective later in the season than intended. 
       The sending into battle of a tired, hungry and thirsty fleet contrary to an 
expert’s advice led to Xerxes’ defeat at Salamis. This resulted in the best of 
the Persian army having to spend the following winter in Thessaly at the end 
of a faltering overland supply line. Mardonius’ return to Athens the next 
spring to completely destroy the city  did nothing to  improve his supply 
situation  but only succeeded in  uniting the Greeks and strengthening their  
resolve to resist and  then defeat their enemy at Plataea. 
Both Xerxes and Mardonius rejected sound advice which 
contributed to their respective sea and land defeats, thus effectively  
ending Persian military ambitions in Europe. Another important component 
in their defeats was the probable failure, partial or perhaps sometimes total, 
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of an extraordinarily complex food supply chain. It was designed to support 
an overwhelming force rather than sufficient man-power to defeat a 
smaller army and navy of temporarily united opponents. As the army 
marched into Greece, away from its major forward food dump in 
Macedonia, the extended overland supply route became uncertain, 
particularly for Mardonius’ army in Thessaly during the winter months. As the 
navy moved in parallel to the army down the passage of the Euripus 
towards Phaleron, it had to rely on sea-borne supplies shipped to a coast 
with insufficient beach space to accommodate the hundreds of warships 
whose crews were increasingly unable to come ashore to be regularly fed 
and rested. Consequently they became progressively less fit and ready to 
fight the battle of Salamis, whilst a similar logistical situation the following 
summer contributed to Mardonius’ defeat at Plataea. 
------oooo------ 
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CHAPTER TWO. 
 COLONISING  AMPHIPOLIS: The real cost of ship-timber. 
 The thin soil of the narrow valleys of Greece or Ionia did not allow for 
the support of growing populations, and from the ninth century onwards  
there was a wide-ranging diaspora of emigrants looking for  places to settle 
from the western Mediterranean to the Black Sea littorals. This resulted in the 
founding of scores of colonies and, in doing so, generated in the Greek 
psyche an ability to sail away and find a new home whenever physical or 
political circumstances demanded it. For example, Herodotus relates an 
extreme case when, the night before Salamis, Themistocles threatened that 
the Athenians would found a new colony in Italy if their fellow-Greeks would 
not stay and fight.139 There was a precedent still in memory, as in 540 the 
Phokaeans had fled their city in pentekonters when threatened by the 
Persians.140  
The Sources 
Thucydides took a great interest in the relationships between mother 
cities and colonies. For example some of his most powerful writing is 
concerned with the relations between Corinth, the mother city, Corcyra, 
the daughter colony and Epidamnus a colony of Corcyra, yet he reports 
with little comment on the colonisation of Amphipolis and its subsequent  
destruction. He gives the impression that the colony was established by  
“civilians” and does not mention whether an  oikist or colony leader was 
appointed.141 Thucydides dismisses this Athenian disaster in two 
sentences.142 
About the same time they sent out to the River Strymon ten 
thousand colonists from their own citizens and from allied states to settle the 
place…now known as Amphipolis. They occupied (it) driving out the 
Edonians who held the place, but when they advanced farther into the 
interior of Thrace, their force was cut to pieces at the Edonian town of 
Drabascus… 
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This terse account of aggressive imperialism leaves the reader 
wondering what is unwritten and unknown about this venture which ended 
with the loss of ten thousand lives. Despite this setback for Athens it was 
successfully recolonised by Hagnon in 437-6.143 Athens lost control of the 
place once and for all to the Spartan Brasidas in 424 thanks to the inability 
of Thucydides to arrive in time to defend it. 
Plutarch throws a rather different light on the matter.144 He says in 
“Cimon”:-  
After the Medes were driven from Greece, Cimon was sent out as 
one of the commanders of the Greek expeditionary force………Now that 
the allies had come over to his side, Cimon assumed command and sailed 
for Thrace. He began by defeating the Persians…who were holding the city 
of Eion on the banks of the Strymon…drove  the Thracian tribes out of their 
territory (and) captured the city. 
 
Cimon’s capture of Eion 
In 476-5, three years after the expulsion of the Persians from Greece, 
the Athenians took their first steps towards becoming the leading state in 
the Aegean basin. Attica had already been largely denuded of its forests 
and Athens had a great need for a reliable source of ship timber. At least 
twenty new triremes were needed each year to replace the oldest vessels 
as they were phased out and thus maintain her fleet strength of 200 ships.  
The difficulty in acquiring ship timber seems to have been a constant 
concern for the Athenians. It even surfaced in the theatre. The dramatist 
Euripides, who lived from 480 almost to the end of the Peloponnesian War 
has the old nurse say in the opening lines of the Medea:-145 
………..If that pine on Pelion’s slopes 
Had never felt the axe, and fallen, to put oars 
Into those heroes’ hands, who went at Pelias’ bidding 
To fetch the golden fleece!.... 
The straight-grained pine (peuke) for oars was cut from forests two
                                             
143 Thuc. 4.102.3. 
144 Cimon  6. 
145 Euripides. Medea & Other Plays tr P.Vellacott.Penguin.1988. Medea 3-6. 
 57
hundred kilometres distant from Athens in the rugged country of north-
eastern Thessaly. Athenian awareness of the prolific sources of timber in 
Macedonia could have dated from the mid-sixth century when the tyrant  
Peisistratus would have taken note of it when exiled to that region. During 
the seventy years from 480 to 410 Athens maintained a fleet of at least 200 
triremes which had a useful life of about 20 years. Replacing about 20 per 
year meant that 1400 warships had to be built and two hundred and eighty 
thousand oars made to propel them.  For optimum strength each oar was 
made from one tree.  
Macedonian resources were controlled by the king who gave gifts 
of timber as he pleased. For example, in 423 Perdiccas II agreed to sell oars 
to Athens only. In 480 Alexander of Macedon was honoured as proxenos  
and euergetes by Athens in recognition of his timber grants to the fleet 
building programme of Themistocles.146 
It would seem that Cimon set out to do something about the supply 
of ship timber. Political instability in Macedon following the death of 
Alexander provided the opportunity for Athenian occupation of the valley 
of the lower Strymon.147 Reading the two accounts of the capture of Eion 
together, Thucydides’ words “about the same time” could mean “after 
Cimon had captured the place…..” This suggests that in order to ensure 
their possession, and to release Cimon’s army for service elsewhere, the 
Athenians almost immediately “sent out” ten thousand settlers to occupy 
what they perceived as a militarily and economically important site on a 
ford over the Strymon. This was known as Ennea Hodoi or “Nine Ways”, 
which they renamed Amphipolis as the site was within a defendable loop of 
the Strymon. Thucydides relates, but Plutarch does not, that the Thracians 
united in alarm and in the following year they defeated the Athenians at 
Drabescus and wiped out their colony.148 
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  The valley of the Strymon is the most fertile in the northern Aegean 
area.149 Not only was the region a valuable source of ship timber, but the  
near-by silver mines of Mount Pangeum were an added attraction, and 
Athens was not alone in coveting it. Although the Persians had been driven 
out (or perhaps  “retired from”) Greece in 479 they  still had a strong grip on 
the fortress towns of Eion on the Strymon and Doriscus, both of which had 
been important food dumps in their attempted conquest of Greece. In 
reviewing the history of this colony there are many questions which come to 
mind about the logistics of the original venture of 476 and to fill out the bare 
facts reported by Thucydides and Plutarch. 
   At the time of Cimon’s expedition, the Greeks were still at war with 
Persia. The decision to “colonise” the area should have been taken by the 
Assembly after his capture of Eion.  It seems more likely that advantage was 
taken of Cimon’s opportunistic military occupation of the area. Although 
Plutarch says that Cimon “handed over this land to the Athenians” it would 
seem that it was a token gesture and the religious and procedural activities  
required to found a colony were dispensed with.150 Two other colonies, Brea 
and Thurii were established in the fifth century and both were founded in 
the traditional manner. As Cimon’s army was needed elsewhere the 
decision was taken to fill the place with “colonists” who would occupy the 
river crossing at Amphipolis. Some Athenians such as Thucydides’ family  
would have been familiar with the territory, and indeed drew their wealth 
from it, but  most would have had little knowledge of the place  which  had 
been under Persian control  for  the previous sixteen years. 
The unusual first colonisation of Amphipolis 
Thucydides tells us that Athens “sent out” ten thousand colonists “of 
their own citizens” and from “allied states” as settlers.151 The two words “sent 
out” raise many questions. Thucydides’ contemporary audience would 
have been well aware of the procedures involved in the permanent 
relocation of large numbers of citizens. This question does not seem to have 
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exercised the minds of modern historians and the interested student can 
only speculate how it was done.  
The formation of a colony generally required the appointment of an 
oikist who consulted the Delphic oracle and performed religious duties as 
the colony leader.152 There would have also been a “foundation decree” 
which is not mentioned by either historian.153 We do not know who the oikist 
was after Cimon withdrew his army. There was generally a sentimental and 
religious connection between mother city and colony, but this connection 
seems to have been absent between Athens and Amphipolis. For one thing 
a large proportion of the colonists were not Athenians having been 
recruited from nearby settlements.  It is therefore suggested that to call the 
first occupation of Amphipolis a “colony” in the long-established Greek 
sense is incorrect. It was no more than an enclave established for imperial 
and logistical reasons by opportunistic military conquest, rather than 
deliberate, peaceful, resettlement of excess population. 
Why the firm number of ten thousand colonists? Aristotle gives a clue 
in his Politics where he quotes the opinion of the Milesian town-planner 
Hippodamus (who laid out the Piraeus) that the ideal city contained ten 
thousand citizens composed of artisans, husbandmen and soldiers in equal 
proportions.154 Wives, children and slaves were not considered. It is 
interesting to note that Xenophon thought that his “Ten Thousand” could 
found a city on the Black Sea coast and presumably find wives and slaves 
locally.155 As Hippodamus flourished early in the Pentecontaetea his views 
would have been well-known and perhaps influential in the decision to 
send the specific number of ten thousand citizens to colonise Amphipolis.156 
This might suggest that the correct religious and political steps were taken to 
form a colony, but Thucydides does not mention the appointment of an 
oikist. Perhaps Cimon as the local army commander was appointed whilst 
his army was in the area.   
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For the purposes of this argument, it is assumed that the personnel 
selected according to the recommendation of Hippodamus, were thetes, 
the humblest class of citizens, and zeugitae, the lowest class which could 
bear arms. There is no mention of a military commander after Cimon had 
left. The military component perhaps consisted of zeugitae trained as 
peltasts, rather than hoplites which Athens could ill spare. It is tempting to 
think that the “citizens from allied states” were Athenian citizens from 
cleruchies, but none existed in the first half of the fifth century. As a matter 
of convenience in moving in “colonists” as quickly as possible, they would 
probably have come from the nearby islands and allied settlements in 
Thrace, a recruitment possibly facilitated by agencies within the Delian 
League.  
  The Athenians would perhaps have not separated free men from 
their families permanently, so it is likely that many of the colonists would 
have been young and single volunteers. They probably would have been 
expected to find wives and slaves for themselves from the local population 
of Edonians. The Edonians incidentally, had been deported to 
Mesopotamia by the Persian general Mardonius about 492 and brought 
home again by Aristagoras of Miletus.157 They were probably in no mood to 
be displaced again, this time by Athenian intruders. Plutarch is probably  
correct in saying that Cimon led his own army rather than “colonists”  in 
capturing Eion, which he did after a long siege, and whilst there, recognised 
the strategic value of the  site of  Amphipolis.158 
Transferring the colonists 
The transferring to Amphipolis of ten thousand men, a small 
proportion of whom were Athenians and mostly “volunteers from other 
places” would have been a difficult task requiring prudent planning.  
Presumably the Athenians were from the lower social classes, hoping to find 
a better life overseas. In order that the colony survive any aggression on the 
part of the local inhabitants, careful coordination  was essential so that all 
the participants arrived in one sailing season and whilst Cimon’s army was 
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still in occupation of nearby Eion. It is possible that  the  Athenian contingent 
could have marched overland through friendly Thessaly, but it is more likely 
that it was  transported in merchant ships or in “trooper” triremes which 
could hold about 150-170 men including the oarsmen who would have 
come from the thetes class and could have been potential colonists 
themselves. In that case a decision would have had to be made whether 
the slow and clumsy troopers made the longer coast-wise passage or risked 
a shorter open sea voyage which would have been more or less to 
windward requiring more rowing than sailing. On arrival, the trooper triremes 
could then have been used by Cimon to help transport his army to his next 
assignment which was the reduction of Dolopian pirates on the island of 
Skyros. The local “allies” would have had very much shorter sea passages 
and could also have travelled overland.  Presumably before withdrawing his 
army, Cimon would have organised the early arrivals, seeing to the 
defences, building of houses, planting of crops and so on.  The difficulty of 
transporting men over some 500 kilometres from Athens, compared with the 
considerably shorter journeys from islands or settlements much closer to 
Amphipolis, would suggest that there was a relatively small proportion of 
Athenians in the colony.      
The newly arrived occupants of Amphipolis would have had  
support from the recently captured port of Eion nearby, to help them 
establish the “colony”. The food supply problem would have been greatly 
eased if the Persian granaries in Eion were still fit to be used. The place had 
been a major Persian food depot only a few years before, and grain ships 
from the Black Sea ports could deliver cargoes there for the use of the 
colonists. 
  Thucydides gives no idea how long after settling in Amphipolis the 
colonists moved towards the neighbouring Edonian town of Drabascus. The 
purpose of their advance was possibly to look for suitable stands of timber 
or for gold or silver mines, or to capture wives and slaves from the local 
population. If the composition of the colonists was according to 
Hippodamus’ recommendations, then only about a third of the men had 
military training and certainly not hoplites, but peltasts at best, and 
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seemingly without competent military leadership. It is hardly surprising that 
they were outnumbered and cut to pieces by the Edonians.  From the 
evidence, it would seem that Athens gained little or no economic 
advantage, either in timber or precious metals out of Amphipolis, before 
Cimon’s ten thousand colonists were destroyed. 
Hagnon’s Colony 
 In 437 the Athenians made a second attempt to colonise Amphipolis 
under the distinguished general Hagnon, and it proved successful for its first 
decade or so as an Athenian strongpoint in Thrace. Thucydides does not 
mention how many colonists were sent there, Graham suggests it is 
reasonable to assume that in accordance with custom, there would have 
been not less than ten thousand.159 It would seem that this time the 
prescribed religious and civil procedures were followed and Hagnon was 
appointed oikist. He “drove out” the local Edonians from the area for a 
second time in their recent experience, built walls around the site of the city 
in the loop of the Strymon, and bridged the river. 
 Apart from being a source of timber, precious metals and taxes,  
Amphipolis had an important strategic value in protecting  Athens’s allies in 
the Thraceward region, and it soon became a thriving community. There 
was however a built-in weakness. At that time, Athens’ man-power 
resources probably amounted to about fifty thousand men, so that the city 
could not afford to supply more than a token force of colonists.160 As a 
result, most of the colonists were recruited from the settlement of Argilus, 
only a few tens of kilometres away, which itself was a colony of Andros.161  
An unfortunate consequence was that most of the new population of 
Amphipolis had little or no loyalty or attachment to Athens, and the 
surrounding Edonians had no love at all for their neighbours. It might have 
been considered that there were sufficient Athenians in the nearby port of 
Eion, who manned the fleet stationed there, to discourage any attacks on 
the town, but events proved otherwise. 
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Building  triremes on the Strymon 
 During the thirteen years of its existence as an Athenian colony, 
Amphipolis must have supplied sufficient ship timber to justify its continued 
occupation. We have no idea how it was organised and can only  
speculate whether uncut timber was shipped to Athens, or, what was much 
more likely,  triremes were built on the banks of the Strymon and then sailed 
to Athens or wherever  they were needed. It can be inferred that Hagnon  
had an economic strategy by including amongst his colonists a proportion 
who were skilled shipwrights. Thucydides reports that thirteen years later, the 
Spartan general Brasidas, who certainly had no maritime experience, but 
was obviously well informed about local ship-building skills, arranged to 
have triremes built at Amphipolis whilst he occupied the place.162 Without 
reading too much into one sentence of Thucydides, it can be inferred that 
local ship-building yards were operating.  It would have been a logical and 
minimum cost solution to build triremes on the spot rather than send uncut 
ship-timber to distant ship-yards. Furthermore, ship-building was a year-
round activity, but shipping uncut timber was possible only in the sailing 
season. This raises the interesting question whether master shipwrights had  
building plans on papyrus as the warships were of  a very similar design 
wherever they were built. On the other hand young men could have 
learned the trade as “apprentices” before being considered as potential 
colonists. 
 The building of triremes on the Strymon instead of shipping timber  
was one thing, but delivering the warships to wherever they were needed, 
was another. Each ship required 170 oarsmen plus ten deckhands and ten 
officers for delivery voyages to Athenian naval bases in the Aegean. It 
would have been a good opportunity for a trierarch to mould his crew into 
a fighting unit during the   voyage.  That meant choosing crews and getting 
them to Amphipolis.  If one reads “The Old Oligarch” a little loosely, it can 
be inferred that most Aegean Greeks, whatever their social status or 
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wherever they lived, had at some time experienced life on the rowing 
benches.163 This being so, it is also possible that Amphipolitan crews 
delivered the newly-built ships.  Either way, this solution was a far better one 
than shipping uncut timber by cargo boat to shipyards throughout the 
Aegean and using it to build ships in an area where transport costs would 
have to be added to the much higher construction costs in allied shipyards. 
This scenario is of course speculative. As far as one can tell, no remains of 
ship-sheds like those uncovered in the Piraeus have been found in the 
neighbourhood of Amphipolis or Eion. 
Brasidas’ capture of Amphipolis 
 The capture of Amphipolis by the Spartan general Brasidas in 424 
was a serious blow to the Athenian war-effort at a time when she had the 
upper hand as a result of the capture of Pylos. Thucydides splits his account 
of Brasidas’ feat into two parts, the first describing his rapid march from the 
neighbourhood of Corinth to Acanthus and, in the second part his capture 
of Amphipolis.164  Brasidas had a small army of seven hundred hoplites and 
a thousand mercenaries.  It would seem that he had been given a free 
hand to use these troops as he wished. There was deep concern in Sparta 
that their helots might revolt, in view of the Athenian killing or capture of 
four hundred and twenty Spartiates on Sphacteria.165 Getting Brasidas’ 
army, with its thousand potential revolutionaries, out of the country was a 
wise precaution. If Brasidas could embarrass the Athenians in the process, 
then it was so much the better. It has been noted above that the Spartans 
were the only Greeks to have an organised commissary and Brasidas 
probably had a supply train in addition to his small army. Thucydides does 
not say how long Brasidas took to cover approximately five hundred 
kilometres into Thrace. Marching hard and fast it would have taken 14 to 16 
days. As he marched in the autumn it might have been possible to “live off 
the land” to a limited extent as the harvest would have been gathered in. 
As Thucydides goes into some detail about it, he must have regarded 
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Brasidas’ march as a remarkable achievement which modern historians 
seem to pass over without comment.166 His march was so rapid that he did 
not give possible Thessalian opposition the time to concentrate their forces 
and confront him. Marching non-stop, he covered the approximately thirty-
five kilometres from Meliteia on the frontier with Achaia to Pharsalos (almost 
half-way across the Plain of Thessaly) in one day.167 He also remarks on the 
Spartan general’s upright and moderate conduct, which reputation proved 
invaluable later in the war when Spartan propaganda gave Athenian allies 
the impression that all Spartans were like him. He used conciliatory 
language in times when terror tactics were usual. His capture of Acanthus 
by suggesting that he might destroy their fruit crop was masterly. 
 Brasidas’ enterprising capture of Amphipolis after a day and night 
march from Arnae in Chalcidice, resulted in the capture of the bridge over 
the Strymon. Campaigning was supposed to be suspended for the winter 
and the Amphipolitan guards were relaxed. He was greatly helped by the 
anti-Athenian sentiments of most of the Argilian inhabitants of Amphipolis, 
who betrayed the place to him. Eucles, the Athenian commander in 
Amphipolis, had only a small force of doubtful loyalty and was helpless. 
Thucydides arrived late on the scene with his fleet of seven triremes and 
had no option but to watch Brasidas take Amphipolis, and use his small 
force to defend Eion. As will be discussed below, triremes in support of land 
forces were highly inefficient. If Thucydides had been able to put ashore at 
Eion seven ship-loads of two hundred soldiers each, or even oarsmen 
trained to fight as peltasts, he might have been able to threaten Brasidas’ 
little army. In the event, attempts by Brasidas to capture Eion were 
frustrated by the lack of Spartan support thanks to their preoccupation with 
the Pylos problem.   
 These events occurred towards the end of the Archidamian war. In 
422 the ambitious politician Cleon, who had shown surprising ability at Pylos, 
was sent to recapture Amphipolis. He was easily out-generalled  by Brasidas 
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but both were killed during the Spartan defence of the town. Amphipolis 
was supposed to have been returned to Athens under the terms of the 
Peace of Nicias in 421, but nothing happened and it remained in Spartan 
hands. The Athenians did not make any more serious attempts to recover 
this very important outpost in the Thraceward region despite its economic 
potential and strategic situation. 
 After the disaster at Syracuse, Athens had to rebuild her fleet by 
every possible means, both through the resources of the state and private 
endeavour. With Amphipolis in hostile hands and Magna Graecia and Sicily 
forever out of reach, there was no alternative but to turn to Macedon. 
Fortunately for Athens, the unreliable king Perdiccas had died, and was 
succeeded by the pro-Athenian Archelaus who by using his royal 
prerogatives provided Athens with timber without compromising 
Macedonian neutrality, for the remainder of the Peloponnesian War.168   
The balance sheet 
  Athens held Amphipolis for two periods together amounting to 
some fourteen or fifteen years between 476 and 422.  During that time ten 
thousand settlers of the first occupation were wiped out at Drabascus. The 
second time it was lost, the Athenian component of Hagnon’s occupation 
force moved to Eion with few casualties. The ship-timber and ship-building 
potential of the place which was denied them had a serious effect on the 
replacement of ageing Athenian battleships. There is no record of the 
amount of silver and gold which was produced during that period, but 
even if it was small its loss would have been felt in Athens when funds were 
badly needed for the prosecution of the war. Just as important was the loss 
of an important strategic centre in the Thraceward region, and an increase 
in Spartan influence in that area.  
Conclusion 
 Amphipolis was not originally colonised in the accepted sense, but 
as the result of an opportunistic seizure of territory by Cimon. Athens 
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probably lost the place the first time due to an attempt to expand the 
settlement with poorly led, lightly armed, and outnumbered troops after the 
departure of Cimon and his army.  The second colony was founded on 
traditional lines, but a large proportion of the colonists had no Athenian 
connections or sentiment, and surrendered the town to the Spartan 
Brasidas as soon as opportunity offered. Athens thus lost an important 
source of ship-timber as such, or, what was much more likely, a valuable 
supplier of fully built triremes, and thus suffered a tactical and strategic 
blow. After Cleon’s ill-fated expedition, and an unsuccessful collaboration 
with the Macedonian, Perdiccas failed in 413, Athens made no further 
attempts to recover the place.169 The price to be paid for Amphipolitan 
ship-timber was far too high. It was far less trouble to honour the 
Macedonian kings as proxenoi and euergetes as had been done before, 
and repeated again for Archelaus in 407/6. 
------oooo------ 
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CHAPTER THREE. 
THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION : The logistics of hubris and hunger. 
Introduction 
Before discussing the logistical implications of the Sicilian Expedition 
it is of interest to get some idea of how, after they had expelled the Persians 
from Greece, the Athenians, contrary to their historical experience, 
developed an ability to mount naval and military expeditions over 
considerable distances at short notice. Athens had been completely 
destroyed in 480, and her inhabitants dispersed to places of safety, and yet 
as soon as the city had been repopulated and its walls had been rebuilt the  
instinct for  aggression asserted itself. 
The Greek poleis had traditionally settled their differences by finding 
a suitable area of level ground convenient to their borders where the 
opposing spear-wielding hoplites could engage in what amounted to a 
lethal shoving match whilst their slave servants hurled stones and abuse. As 
these encounters were very rarely far from home, the campaigns were short 
ones, taking place in the months between sowing and reaping. The 
Athenian hoplites who fought at Plataea and in front of Syracuse were 
“amateur” soldiers, as they had no formal military training before 325.170 
Each hoplite was attended by a slave who carried his master’s food 
supplies, armour and weapons. There was no properly organised supply 
system and the needs of the combatants were met by civilian merchants 
who followed the army. In this respect the Spartans were the exception, as 
every fit man was a full-time soldier who was served in the field by a 
properly organised supply train manned by helot slaves.  The Athenian 
reliance on civilian suppliers for the army applied equally to the navy as 
Athens extended her hold over the Aegean communities. 
The learning curve: Cimon’s long-range naval warfare 
Thirty years after the victory of the Hellenes over the Persians, the 
growing power of the Athenians was causing strained relations between the 
city and its neighbours.  Having made a five year truce with the Spartans,   
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Athens cast around for an excuse for a war.  Being still at war with the Great 
King, they did not have far to look.  Thucydides  says that in 450 :-171   
 Having no Hellenic war on their hands, the Athenians, under the 
command of Cimon, made an expedition against Cyprus with 200 ships of 
their own and of their allies. Sixty of these were detached to go to Egypt at 
the request of Amyrtaeus, king of the marshes, with the rest they laid siege 
to Citium. 
 
 Plutarch in his “Life” of Cimon says :-172 
…..(Cimon) had 200 triremes manned, with the object of making another 
expedition against Egypt and Cyprus. His plan was to keep the Athenians in 
constant training through their operations against the barbarians and to 
allow them to profit from the wealth they took from their natural 
enemies…after detaching a squadron  of sixty ships to proceed to Egypt, he 
made for Cyprus with the remainder.  He defeated the king’s fleet….in a 
sea battle and won over the cities in the neighbourhood. 
 
There was of course more to it than that. The Persians still controlled 
the rich wheat-lands of the Black Sea littoral and were conducting an  
economic war on Athens, indeed, on all  Greece. They also held wheat-rich 
Egypt except for the Nile delta, where guerrillas were being supported by 
Athens. Bearing in mind that open water passages were safest between 
May and September, it would be expected that the planning of the 
expedition, assembly of combatants and their shipping would have been 
made during the winter months.  The reading of Thucydides suggests that it 
was an almost ad hoc decision to make war on Cyprus and assist the 
Egyptian king. Certainly, the planning period must have been very short 
and the supplying of the combatants left, as was traditional, to the private 
enterprise of Athenian merchants. Thucydides does not mention how many 
supply ships accompanied the fleet. It is not likely that the Athenians risked 
their entire fleet of warships to this bold long-range venture and not all of 
the troops would have been hoplites.  In the thirty years since Salamis those 
battleships which had survived had rotted away, and improvements in the 
design of the new vessels allowed for blue-water instead on in-shore 
operations. Cimon was able to use larger and modified ships to carry a 
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“great number” of hoplites in which storage had to be available for armour 
and weapons. He might have used older ships converted to “trooper” 
triremes, the oarsmen being trained as peltasts or light infantry of some sort. 
There was a precedent for this. Herodotus implies that the whole of the 
manpower of the invading Athenian and Eretrian fleet had marched on 
Sardis in 498, the oarsmen taking on some sort of military role.173  
The nearest point on Cyprus is some 900 kilometres from Athens. The 
first half of the voyage would have been easy “island-hopping” as far as 
Rhodes,  but the second half meant making either a risky open sea passage 
or coasting down the inhospitable and Persian-held southern coast of 
Anatolia before heading westwards over about 80 kilometres of open sea 
to the north coast of Cyprus. It should be noted that Cimon attacked Cition 
on the more sheltered southern coast of the island, even further away and 
with a long coastwise voyage to windward back to Athens. It would not 
have been possible to complete the enterprise within one sailing season 
which meant that the fleet would have had to over-winter on Cyprus 
around the captured port of Cition. The early return of the fleet was 
apparently due to lack of provisions and the death of its commander.174 It is 
likely that the Athenian force could not live off the land once the supplies 
carried with the fleet had run out. 
 Despite its early conclusion, Cimon’s successful naval and infantry  
assault on a distant enemy coast within a limited  “window of opportunity”, 
demonstrated to the increasingly confident Athenians what could be done. 
Their naval control of the Aegean Sea during the Pentecontaetea, in which 
time warship design was being improved meant that “blue water” passages  
of  200-300 kilometres  became less risky. Thucydides relates at 3.49, how, in 
427, following the Mytilinian Debate, a trireme made a non-stop voyage of 
340 kilometres from Piraeus to Mytilene under oar-power only. The 
circumstances were exceptional, but demonstrated that twenty-three years  
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after Cimon, the most modern ships available could make long voyages in 
fair weather.  Whether the crews would have been ready for battle after a 
long voyage was another matter, which was appreciated by the Syracusan 
leader Hermocrates.175 
Athens and Sicily 
 Sicily was well known to the Greeks at large, as the island had been 
colonised mainly by Corinth, Chalcis, Eretria and Megara, from the late 
eighth century onwards, and the Corinthian foundation of Syracuse had 
become an important maritime power. Athens was particularly attached to 
Ionian Leontini in the east of the island, and Segesta further west.  The 
habitual Greek propensity for internecine strife had been carried with the 
colonists to Sicily, and Dorian and Ionian colonies were continually at war 
with one another. The island had become a well-developed source of 
cereals which were in demand by most of the Greek poleis, particularly 
Athens, which had insufficient agricultural resources to feed its urban 
populations. The Persians had lost the war of 480-79, but remained in control 
of the wheat-lands of Egypt and the Black Sea littoral, had a strong 
influence in Greek affairs. In 427 Athens intervened in hostilities between 
their ally, Leontini, and Syracuse ostensibly to aid Leontini, but in reality to 
prevent corn being sent to the Peloponnese and at the same time to 
establish whether it was possible to gain control of the island and its 
extensive wheat-growing capabilities.176 Pericles’ warning that Athens 
should not attempt   imperial conquest whilst at war with Sparta was quite 
forgotten.177 This expedition was a relatively small one of twenty ships, 
sufficient to gain experience in sailing without interference along the hostile 
western coast of the Peloponnese. The Athenians would have relied on their 
allies and friendly cities to supply them whilst in Sicily, but some form of 
supply ship must have been part of the fleet which sailed from Athens for a 
visit which extended into the following year.178 Those Athenians who 
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entertained thoughts of conquest in Sicily would have gained a good idea 
of the logistical problems involved in transporting and supplying an army for 
some one thousand four hundred kilometres entirely by sea, a voyage 
which required coasting along mainly hostile shores. The two 
reconnaissance  expeditions lasted  into the following years so that, like 
Cimon’s  Cyprus venture, the hoplites were away from home for an 
extended period  and  the first signs of a full-time force appeared in a 
Greek army apart from that of the Spartans.179 Nevertheless, the returning 
commanders were punished for not having subdued the island!180 
The Sicilian Expedition    
 For long periods during the Peloponnesian War, her sea-power 
gave Athens  an advantage  over the  land-bound power of Sparta.  
Confidence grew  to the point where, with experience gained from the 
expeditions of 427 and  424, the ambitious Alcibiades was able to convince 
his fellow citizens that they could mount a successful sea-borne attack on  
Syracuse, which, being a colony of Corinth was Dorian and hence a natural 
enemy.  The Persian defeat at Salamis was almost seven decades in the 
past, and the lessons which should have been learned from the 
consequences of long-range military adventures were unheeded by the  
brilliant, but flawed politician. The experienced Athenian general Nicias, 
who was known for his cautious competence, like the Persian Artabanus 
before him, pointed out the logistical difficulties of long-range warfare. He 
was outvoted and unlike the Persian, obliged to share in the command of a 
venture totally different from the short-term campaigns on which his 
reputation was gained. Nicias also had other irons in the fire. He was in fact 
the Syracusan proxenos and having connections in that city and being well-
informed about its affairs, sought political advantage rather than a military 
solution.181 
It is not intended to discuss the Sicilian expedition in detail, but to 
highlight the effects of ad hoc planning of the expedition by three generals 
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each with a different agenda. It is  remarkable how quickly the Athenians 
mounted the expedition once Alcibiades had convinced the people that  
they could capture Syracuse, a city the size of Athens, and  some one 
thousand four hundred kilometres of coastwise sailing distant . It must be a 
measure of their self-confidence that after a very short period of planning 
and preparation, they sailed in August with the sailing season already half 
over.182 
   There was no question of the fleet “living off the land”, because 
the coasts of the Peloponnese as far as Cephallenia, although not heavily 
populated, were hostile. They later found that they were not welcome 
along the Italian coasts of Magna Graecia, indeed Tarentum and Locri 
even refused both anchorage and water, which must have caused 
considerable difficulties. Nevertheless, the Athenians were able to store 
ready-cut ship-timber at Caulonia not far from Locri, which was later denied 
them by the Syracusans who burnt it.183 The supply ships had been 
instructed in advance to gather at Corcyra to await the arrival of the fleet, 
presumably to avoid any delay due to their slower sailing speed, and 
ensure that their cargoes were immediately available. Presumably they 
must have sailed from Athens some time in advance of the warships. 
Thucydides says that there were thirty supply ships which accommodated 
bakers as well as other craftsmen from which it can be inferred that they  
carried grain.184  There was in addition a large fleet of small ships, some of 
which accompanied the fleet for the purpose of trade in a manner 
analogous to the merchants who followed Greek armies. This method of 
informal supply was also used by the Syracusans.185  During one of the last 
battles in the Great Harbour, the Syracusan authorities ordered the market 
vendors to move their stalls down to the waterfront so that the trireme crews 
could come ashore, buy their food and take their dinners close to their 
ships, and then continue the battle. The Athenians were unprepared for the 
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renewed attack, and were defeated in an extraordinary precursor of 
Aigospotami. 
  By the end of the fifth century merchant ships could carry at least 
100 tons of cargo so that the fleet could have taken some three thousand 
tons of grain with it, plus additional amounts shipped by the accompanying 
merchants.186  Thucydides says that at least one of the Athenian merchant 
ships was of 250 tons capacity.187 This suggests that the invaders could have 
carried with them considerably more than three thousand tons of grain. 
Bearing in mind that Athens imported Black Sea grain to feed its population, 
such a large tonnage could have only been immediately available to 
supply the expedition from stocks in the commercial granaries in the 
Piraeus. In view of the short time between the decision to go to Syracuse 
and carrying out the plan, cargoes arriving from the Black Sea also might 
have been immediately re-routed to Corcyra. Alcibiades recognised the 
need to make friends with the native Sicels and Siciliot cities in order that 
they might supply grain to the invaders.188 There must have been a 
considerable lapse of time between the arrival of the first and last supply 
ships at Rhegium, which was the assembly point before crossing the strait to 
Sicily. 
Going ashore to eat and rest 
In the seven decades since Salamis, Athenian experience during the 
Pentecontaetea would have continued the development of the trireme as 
a long-range fighting ship. It was essential that some food and water had to 
be carried on board, otherwise the coastwise passage of four or five days 
to Corcyra with the necessary overnight beaching would not have been 
possible. An example of this difficulty is found in a passage in Demosthenes’ 
“Against Polycles”, quoted by Hornblower in a different context.189 
We sailed from Thasos to Stryme, when it was still winter and there 
were no harbours, and it was not possible to disembark or eat our dinner 
because the terrain was hostile… 
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However, Xenophon relates how a fighting ship could beach 
overnight in enemy territory.190  Describing the voyage of Iphicrates round 
the Peloponnese to Corcyra in 373, he says:- 
 
…if he chanced to be taking the midday meal in a hostile country, 
he posted some on the land, as is proper, but besides he hoisted the masts 
on the ships and had men keep watch from their tops……further, wherever 
he dined or slept, he would not have a fire inside the camp during the 
night, but kept a light burning in front of his forces, so that no one could 
approach unobserved……And although they took both their noonday and 
evening meals in the enemy’s country, nevertheless by doing only the 
necessary things, he always got to sea before the enemy’s forces arrived to 
repel him and speedily got away again . 
 
The Athenian fleet of 134 triremes with over five thousand hoplites (of 
whom only 1700 were Athenian) must have used a similar method on its 
voyage first to Corcyra and then along the southern coast of Italy. The 
warships would have beached along a considerable length of coast and 
any local opposition would have been overwhelmed by the numbers of 
Athenians and could not have prevented them landing and resting 
overnight.  
The total number of the first invasion force as listed by Thucydides 
amounts to some twenty-three thousand three hundred and fifty 
combatants and oarsmen, apart from the crews of the accompanying 
merchant ships.  If each man was allowed a daily ration of 1.36 kilograms of 
grain then the almost 32 tons a day required would have been used up in 
about three months, by which time the  sailing season would have 
ended.191 Further supplies in bulk would have become problematic and the 
stocks carried by the merchants would have been used up. In an operation 
similar to that supplying the Persian fleet seven decades earlier, the 
Athenian triremes needed supply ships to accompany them in order to feed 
their crews on a daily basis. 
The alliance of the islands of Corcyra and Cleon with Athens was 
essential, as they were key concentration points for the Athenian naval  
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forces and supply ships preparing for the 120 kilometre open-water 
passage across the Adriatic Sea to the southern tip of Italy. In order to 
protect the merchant ships, the Athenians had to maintain a squadron of 
some twenty triremes at Naupactus at the entrance to the Gulf of Corinth. 
This meant an additional heavy demand on Athenian resources which 
could not be used to supply the forces in front of Syracuse.  
The failure of the three generals, Alcibiades, Lamachus and Nicias to 
agree on a strategy , the recall to Athens of Alcibiades, and the death of 
Lamachus, left the invasion force under the command of the unenthusiastic 
and ailing Nicias who in a superstitious age, was known for his superstitions.  
The sea coast around Syracuse is mostly rocky, and a probably inadequate 
beach on which to over-winter their triremes, was found and occupied at 
Olympieium within the Great Harbour of Syracuse to the south of the city.  
As soon as the Athenians beached their ships, they were faced with a 
Syracusan army which, unlike the Athenians, had strong cavalry support.  
Nicias drew up half of his army eight shields deep as was the usual Greek 
custom for a hoplite battle.192 The inexperienced Syracusans faced the 
Athenians sixteen shields deep.  It is interesting to note that the other half of 
the Athenian army formed up in the rear also eight shields deep protecting 
a square of baggage carriers.193  In reporting this arrangement, Thucydides 
infers that the crews of the navy and supply ships were a serious liability to 
the army, which had to provide protection for the non-combatants. It 
would seem that Nicias already had in mind a solution to a tactical problem 
previously unknown to Greek generals of having to use a significant part of 
his army to protect non-combatants who outnumbered the soldiers three to 
one, with nowhere to retreat if the enemy was victorious. 
 The Athenians defeated the inexperienced Syracusans, and with 
winter setting in, the victorious Athenians surrendered their advantage, 
vacating their base in the Great Harbour and sailing away to set up winter 
quarters in Naxos and Catana. No Greek general apart from Cimon had 
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ever fought a campaign so far from home over an extended period, and at 
that time organised siege-craft had not been a feature of Athenian military 
expertise. Nicias’ inexperience was exposed in his hope that his early victory 
would persuade surrounding communities to supply grain to feed his troops 
until he attacked Syracuse the following spring.194 Despite their shortage of 
grain and intention to persuade the surrounding peoples to supply them, 
the Athenians burned the growing crops around Megara, presumably to 
deny the Syracusans what they could not take for themselves.195 Later that 
following summer the Athenians destroyed the water-pipes which ran 
underground into Syracuse.196 Thucydides does not mention whether this 
ancient practice in siege warfare had any effect on the Syracusan 
resistance.    
The size of the first Athenian camp in the Great Harbour does not 
seem to be appreciated by historians. The 5.5 metre-wide triremes needed 
at least 10 metres of beach to haul out their 30 ton mass. On first landing, 
the 134 triremes would therefore have needed a gently sloping strand at 
least 2 kilometres long on which to pull them all out of the water, as 
“Mediterranean mooring” would not have been practicable. The merchant 
ships would have had to remain afloat. If 10 square metres are allowed per 
man for sleeping, space, stores, cooking fire etc, the camp would have 
been about 150 metres deep, hence having a perimeter of some two and 
a half kilometres to defend. This does not include the space needed for the 
crews of the merchant ships and other camp followers. Had Demosthenes’ 
reinforcements arrived then, the depth would have at least doubled, and 
many triremes left afloat as there would have been no more room on the 
beach. It should be noted that the distance from the mouth of the Anapus 
river to the Syracusan wall was a little over ten stadia or about two 
kilometres.197 With many hundreds of fires burning every day, it would have 
taken only a short time for an area a long distance away from the camp to 
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be denuded of firewood. That could perhaps have been another 
compelling reason for the subsequent Athenian withdrawal to over-winter in 
Catana and Naxos. 
The fleet in support of the army 
Throughout the Pentekontaetia the Athenian navy was the “senior 
service”. It was acknowledged that an Athenian army or that of an ally 
usually played a supporting role to the navy, as for example in Phormio’s 
campaign in the Gulf of Corinth in 429-8.198 The Sicilian Expedition was 
probably the first occasion in Athenian military experience when the 
situation was reversed, that is, the navy being used in support of the army. 
The hoplite army of five thousand one hundred men, which had landed in 
Sicily had been shipped there with a trireme escort rowed by some sixteen 
thousand men, that is, three times the number of combatants and hence 
three times the number of men for whom food, water, firewood and shelter 
had to be found. 
 When in command of a trireme squadron in 424, Thucydides had 
been unable to prevent the Spartan Brasidas from occupying Amphipolis 
with an army not much bigger than the total number of the deck crews 
and oarsmen of his seven ships.199 He might have realised that when their 
roles were reversed and triremes were used against an army, (which by 
definition meant a long way from home) they were extremely inefficient in 
terms of the relative amount of manpower required. The words he put in the 
mouth of Alcibiades   advising the Spartans to:- 
……..send (to Syracuse) by ship such a body of troops as, after 
working their own passage at the oar, can at once serve as hoplites,  
 
This could have well been Thucydides’ own opinion gained from his painful 
experience at Amphipolis.200  
It was a revolutionary suggestion that Spartiates, should so demean 
themselves socially by becoming oarsmen!  Alcibiades would have known 
that there had been a precedent in 428 when a shortage of funds obliged 
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Paches to use hoplites as oarsmen in his attack on Mytilene.201  If the 
Spartans had accepted his advice they would made a huge savings of 
supplies. It seems that the Athenians also realised that their civilian-supplied 
commissariat, would be overwhelmed if their troops were sent with an 
escort of triremes. When Athens did send reinforcements in response to 
Nicias’ appeal, the hoplites were carried in merchant ships instead of 
trooper triremes, which probably took longer, but with a great saving in 
manpower. The Spartans also compromised and did the same thing.   The 
use of hoplites as oarsmen was apparently not considered by the 
conservative leadership of either side.  Like the Persian fleet  three quarters 
of a century earlier, the hoplites and the crews transporting them had only 
the overnight shelter they could improvise and  the longer the voyage took, 
the more likely the soldiers’ fighting ability would be reduced. 
Nicias’ letter to Athens  
During his campaign the next spring, Nicias occupied the  high 
ground known as Plemmyrium at the  far end of the Great Harbour opposite 
Syracuse, which appeared at first sight  a suitable location for hauling out 
his triremes which were being used to control the entrance to the harbour. 
His letter to Athens asking for either reinforcements or permission to 
withdraw, shows just how mistaken he was.202  He describes how he could 
not dry out his triremes as they had to be constantly on patrol to keep the 
growing Syracusan fleet in check. Furthermore, there were no sandy 
beaches but a rocky shore-line.  The site did not have a reliable water 
source and the firewood available was soon used up.  That meant the 
trireme crews there and the occupants of the three forts had to go further 
and further away from the camp searching for water and kindling. 
Consequently, they were exposed to attack by the Syracusan cavalry from 
which the Athenians could get no protection, having only a few cavalry of 
their own.  As a consequence the loss of skilled oarsmen meant that fewer 
ships could be fully manned to patrol the bay, and those that were crewed 
were in constant use and as a result of never being out of the water, were 
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steadily rotting away.  In logistical terms, failure to reconnoitre the site to 
ensure it had sufficient water and firewood available, resulted in steadily 
depleted crews and rotting ships. The Athenians had arrived in Sicily, with 
only a token cavalry force in a country well-known for its horsemen. They 
now suffered from this serious lack of judgement and the navy could not 
protect the army. The arrival of reinforcements under Demosthenes, 
doubled the number of Athenian hoplites and exacerbated the supply 
problem. The enlarged Athenian army was countered by Spartan 
intervention under the experienced Gylippus. The war then changed in 
character, becoming one of heavy infantry fighting over hilly and uneven 
ground, the Syracusans  having peltasts and cavalry as well.  Despite the 
fact that all the sea fighting was within the harbour, Nicias put his trust in his 
superiority in trireme numbers rather than persisting with infantry operations. 
However the Athenian navy became steadily less effective as it lost 
confidence, and was eventually defeated by the Syracusans. During the 
battle in the harbour the troops which were supposed to be defending 
Plemmyrion were surprised by Gylippus who captured the forts built there.203 
The forts held the garrison’s supplies and also the masts and sails for forty 
triremes and the stock of spare oars. This was the second time the Athenians 
had been obliged to abandon their base and this time relocate in an 
unhealthy marsh. This meant that the Athenians had not only lost essential 
material, but could no longer protect supply ships entering the harbour, the 
chief reason for the subsequent deterioration of the army.      
The only suitable sites on which to beach their ships were inside the 
Great Harbour. It probably never occurred to Nicias, or to the Syracusans, 
that he was unwittingly in a trap. The Spartan general, Gylippus, saw his 
opportunity and ordered the harbour entrance to be blocked with a barrier 
of old triremes chained together. By closing the entrance to the Great 
Harbour the Syracusans prevented supply ships from reaching the 
Athenians, forcing them to retreat from the city. 
 It is difficult to understand how Nicias, already defeated on land 
and sea outside the walls of Syracuse and unable to obtain sea-borne 
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supplies, should, after an eclipse of the moon, be so influenced by his 
soothsayers’ prognostications that he delayed the retreat of the army for 27 
days.204 Plutarch uses the phrase “another full period of the moon” but 
Diodorus writing four centuries after the event claims the delay was only 
three days.205 Whichever is correct, the Athenians were already  
desperately short of supplies and the total destruction of their army  might 
have been prevented if superstition had not been allowed to override 
common sense. However, Nicias was presented with a problem no other 
Greek general had ever had to solve. He had to conduct a retreat with ten 
thousand combatants protecting three times as many non-combatant 
oarsmen and camp followers who had to carry the supplies of food and 
water.206 If the army formed up to confront their pursuers, the non-
combatants would have been cut to pieces and the supplies lost. The only 
hope was for the hoplite screen round the non-combatants to hold off the 
enemy for as long as possible. It was a “lose-lose” situation and the result, 
total defeat. 
Conclusion  
 In the seventy years after Salamis, the Athenians had built up a 
tradition of naval warfare over the relatively short distances between islands 
in the Aegean Sea. The military mind-set did not change. The navy, like the 
army, was paid a daily wage and the soldiers or crews purchased their 
needs wherever they came ashore, or lived off the land, whilst the 
commissariat remained in the hands of merchants who followed the army 
or the fleet.  
 With the promise of a reliable source of cereals, spurred on by the  
ambitions of Alcibiades, and without their generals having determined the 
political leanings of Italiot and Siciliot cities along their route, the voting 
Athenian public endorsed the expedition. Their leaders did not even know 
in advance which of the coastal cities on their route would provide them 
with food and water.  Athenian hubris had generated such a level of self-
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206 See appendix 5 for a discussion on Nicias’ order of march. 
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confidence that they opened a “second front” in their war with the 
Spartans, and paid a terrible price for it. 
 There are interesting similarities between the Persian invasion of 
Greece and the Athenian invasion of Sicily. The Persians believed that with 
their enormous resources of money and man-power, victory was certain, 
and they were mobilised for it at the command of the despot Xerxes. The 
Athenians on the other hand had an extraordinarily optimistic self-
confidence of certain victory, which every citizen shared, and had 
democratically voted for war in Sicily after listening to public speeches for 
and against the venture.  
Both expeditions attempted the capture and destruction of large 
thalassic cities a long way from their bases. In both cases the defenders 
were outnumbered. There was only a small proportion of Persian troops in 
the multinational Persian army whilst the navy was manned entirely by 
subject peoples. Per contra, the powerful Athenian navy was built and 
manned mainly by its own citizens which supported an army  consisting of a 
large proportion of allies most of whom were from other parts of Greece.  In 
both cases disagreement about strategy and failing supply lines ended in 
the defeat of the aggressors.     
------oooo------ 
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CHAPTER FOUR. 
THE HELLESPONT REVISITED: applied logistics. 
The Greeks considered all peoples outside of Hellas to be barbarians, and, 
without exception, uncultured and uncivilised. They included the 
Macedonians who, until the reign of Philip II (359-336) probably deserved 
the appellation. Philip made great efforts to hellenise his subjects to the 
point where he hired Aristotle to tutor his son, Alexander. 
Greek notions of their superiority probably contributed to their failure 
to apply logistical principles to the organisation of their armies and navies, 
but Philip, who was both a political and military genius, soon became an 
opponent to be reckoned with. His forebears had seen and no doubt 
passed on their observations of the slow-moving Persian armies which had 
invaded their territory a century before his time. Philip transformed his army 
into a highly-trained mobile force. The use of carts was forbidden, and 
servants were restricted to one for every ten foot-soldiers and one for each 
cavalry-man. They carried hand-mills for grinding grain, and other 
equipment. On average, there would have been one camp-follower for 
four combatants. Philip apparently forbade wives and women to 
accompany the army. The foot-soldiers, precursors of “Marius’ Mules”, were 
expected to carry their arms, armour, utensils, and provisions for a few days, 
whilst on the march. Pack-animals were kept to the minimum.207 His battle 
formation of the phalanx armed with the 5 metre long sarissa was irresistible, 
and with it, Philip destroyed the concept of the polis at Chaeronea in 338. 
Alexander was perhaps more Greek than the Greeks, and with the army he 
inherited from his father, went to war with Persia in 334 in revenge for their 
destruction of Athens a century and half before. 
The  sources 
Alexander’s expedition was well documented by ancient authors,  
particularly Arrian, Curtius, Diodorus Siculus, and Plutarch, none of whom 
were anywhere near contemporary. They probably drew on the favourable 
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accounts of Alexander’s associates, Ptolemy, son of Lagus, and the 
apologist Aristobulus.208 
Crossing the Hellespont 
 None of the sources state where Alexander concentrated his army 
before commencing his march to the Hellespont to cross into Asia.209  Arrian 
says simply that Alexander marched to the Hellespont in the spring (of 334) 
with “not much more” than thirty thousand infantry and five thousand 
cavalry.  Using a ratio of one camp-follower to four combatants, the total 
force would have numbered about forty-four thousand. Arrian begins his 
account with the army already on the march at Lake Cercinitis.210 Engels 
suggests that Alexander concentrated his army at Therma during the winter, 
recognising, like Xerxes before him, that it had excellent communications 
and a plentiful water supply. Furthermore the bulk of his supplies could be 
more efficiently carried by ship as far as Sestos on the Hellespont some 500 
kilometres, (or 20 marching days) away. Engels, (quoting Plutarch’s “Life of 
Alexander”) says that the army carried a 30-day supply of cereals with 
them, as water and forage would still be plentiful en route and avoided 
taking food stocks from their own countrymen.211 Using Engels’ estimate of 
1.36 kilograms of cereal per day per man, the amount of grain carried at 
the start of the expedition would amount to one thousand eight hundred 
tons, which could be carried in five large cargo ships.212  
 Arrian says that Alexander’s army marched by way of the coastal 
towns of Amphipolis, Abdera, and Maronea where they could be 
revictualled from the accompanying ships.213 This march of twenty days 
should be compared with the 74 days taken by the Persian army along the 
same route in the reverse direction from the bridge of boats to Therma.214  
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This is a vivid example of how a cumbersome supply train slowed down a 
marching army. 
 Engels points out that when the army arrived at Sestos it still had ten 
days supplies which were probably stored in the ships. This strategy would 
have allowed the grain in the fields to ripen and allow the Macedonians to 
secure a bridgehead on the Asian shore if their landing was opposed by the 
Persians. Furthermore, the ships could unload stores at Asian ports like Arisbe 
and Lampsacus prior to the army moving inland.215 
 Arrian says that the army was ferried across the Hellespont from 
Sestos by means of 160 triremes and “a good number of cargo boats” 
presumably to Abydos on the Asian shore.216  The carrying capacity of the 
trireme had no doubt improved in the 150 years since Salamis and it can be 
assumed that a trireme used as a trooper could hold up to one hundred 
soldiers. Given that four triremes could load and unload at the same time 
on both sides of the strait, using a sort of “shuttle service” in a constant 
stream, allowing half an hour to load and then unload 100 men and 
allowing one hour for the approximately five kilometre crossing, the whole 
army could have been taken across the Hellespont in three days. This 
operation would have used up three of the ten days’ supplies still available - 
a point Engels omits. It would also be interesting to know from where 
Alexander obtained the 160 triremes he needed for a rapid crossing of the 
Hellespont. As he was the hegemon of Greece, he probably requisitioned 
them from all round the Aegean, Athens in particular. If the triremes were 
rowed with only two of the three tiers of rowers, then food had to be found 
for about sixteen thousand oarsmen, another 22 tons a day!    
 In the event, Alexander’s landing in Asia was unopposed and he 
was able to commence his incredible conquest of most of the known world 
and some which was not. His grasp of the capabilities and limitations of 
logistics was probably better than any general since his time.  Alexander 
showed, exceptionally, that Artabanus could be mistaken. As Engels has 
put it:-  
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 “The terrain of the Persian Empire was in a real sense the Persian 
king’s most formidable weapon. Its extensive deserts, salt wastelands, 
barren, impenetrable mountain ranges….were immense obstacles to any 
invading army”.217  
 
 By cutting out the masses of camp followers essential to the Persians; 
and by careful forward planning, neglected by the Athenians, Alexander 
succeeded with his small army where Persian forces in Greece and 
Athenian forces before Syracuse, both more powerful than their opponents, 
had failed. 
------oooo------ 
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CONCLUSION 
 Both the Persians with their enormous resources and Athens with her 
very much smaller armament had a common attitude of mind. They were 
both certain of victorious conquest. The driving forces were however quite 
different. The Persians sought revenge, the Athenians a reliable source of 
cereals.  
The Persians commenced not only the planning, but actual work, 
years in advance of their invasion of Greece. By contrast, the Athenians 
began preparations for the Sicilian expedition only a few months 
beforehand.  The Persians set up food dumps for a huge army which could 
not possibly “live off the land”. The Athenians relied largely on 
accompanying merchants to maintain supplies. Scholars differ about the 
location of the biggest Persian dump at a site named Leuce Acte.  It is here 
suggested that this important supply point was at the head of the Thermaic 
Gulf where the Persian army and navy were concentrated before invading 
Greece. 
 A likely reason for the Persian defeat at Salamis was the steadily 
deteriorating shipboard conditions and mounting hunger, thirst and 
weariness of the oarsmen of their fleet. The aristocratic Persian commanders 
probably had no idea of what life was like in the crowded hulls of triremes. 
A similar assessment can be made for the condition of the ordinary Persian 
infantryman at Plataea. 
  The planners would certainly have had a good idea of the useful 
life of the bridges of boats. If they became unusable before the army could 
be withdrawn, then the army was like the trireme crews, expendable 
(“…..what are a few planks?”).218  Xerxes had gained his revenge for Sardis 
and Marathon by burning Athens to the ground. The enormous logistical 
cost in men and materials was of no consequence. 
        The Persians made no further attempt at a military adventure in Europe. 
However, they achieved their aims at no risk to themselves by strategic use 
of the most useful of all logistical devices – money. Floods of darics paid for 
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Persia’s enemies to fight each other, and in the course of time the Great 
King, now Artaxerxes, was able to dictate an advantageous peace.219     
 The colonisations of Amphipolis give the impression that the 
Athenians imitated Persian methods in shipping in mostly foreigners to  
populate and defend their new foundation.  Despite the importance of the 
colony for its supply of timber and precious metals, as well as its strategic 
value as a strongpoint to protect the Thraceward region, a confidence was 
placed in inhabitants with suspect loyalties, which proved disastrous.  
  The topography of Greece with its many narrow valleys resulted in  
the creation of small  political units, the poleis, engaged in endemic 
warfare.  Wars occurred almost annually and lasted a few weeks at most 
between the sowing and reaping of crops. Battles were fought at locations 
where there was enough level ground in a valley, for the land-owning 
gentlemen-farmer hoplites to engage in their spear against spear shoving 
matches.  With the exception of the Spartans, whose every fit citizen was a 
full-time soldier, the concept of an organised commissariat to plan for, and 
deliver supplies to the army was entirely missing. In the case of Athens, the 
trireme crews had a daily rate of pay with which they had to buy their own 
supplies when ashore. This mind-set persisted until the shortage of man-
power obliged Athens to hire Thracian mercenaries to fight at Syracuse in 
414, and the professional Greek soldier began to appear on battlefields as, 
for example, Xenophon’s “Ten Thousand” at Cunaxa in 401. 
   There is an interesting parallel between the Persian invasion of 
Greece in 480 and the Athenian assault on Sicily seventy five years later. 
Both were mounted by forces overwhelmingly superior in numbers to their 
opponents. Both were fought at the end of very long supply lines, neither of 
which was sustainable, the former by the demands of sheer numbers and 
the latter by the habitual use of outside agencies of doubtful reliability in the 
form of private merchants. 
 On the other hand, the two campaigns were quite different in that 
the Persian invasion was carefully planned at least four years in advance, 
the “high command” being well informed by the use of spies. The Athenians    
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made their arrangements to attack Cyprus under Cimon, and to invade 
Sicily only a few months in advance of the decisions to attack, and with 
limited knowledge of the intended battlegrounds. It is true that Nicias was 
Syracusan proxenos in Athens, but he had not necessarily ever visited that 
city. The custom of allowing private enterprise to supply both their army and 
navy persisted. The Athenians were so confident of success that they did 
not even find out in advance which of the coastal cities in Italy would allow 
them supplies of food and water. Athenian hubris, personified in Alcibiades, 
believed that they were capable of defeating their enemies without the 
need for detailed forward planning. They used the same methods for a 
large-scale, long-range war as they always had done in their frequent small 
wars within peninsular Greece. Civilian merchants still followed the navy with 
merchant ships and the army with a string of loaded pack-animals, and 
went home again with the combatants’ drachmae to stock up another  
shipment. 
Another aspect of Athenian over-confidence was that it did not 
seem to have crossed their minds that Syracuse was a city much the same 
size as Athens, with extensive maritime interests, including shipbuilding and, 
backed by Spartan military expertise, would be able to resist them. The  
“shock and awe”  of the  arrival of the Athenian fleet before Syracuse was 
soon  dissipated by the invaders inability to take by assault the nearby small 
town of Hybla  Geleatis. 220  
 Despite their remarkable recovery from the Sicilian disaster, the 
Athenians still did not learn the necessity for logistical planning. Hubris 
persisted, and their final defeat at Aigospotami was entirely due to scorn for 
their enemy, the Athenians leaving their beached ships undefended whilst 
their crews went to buy food in nearby communities.221 Their persistence in 
going to war without a properly organised commissariat finally cost them 
total defeat, the humiliation and starvation of their city and the loss of their 
empire.  
------oooo------ 
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Appendix 1. 
The diameter of the bridge cables. 
 Herodotus reports at 7.36, that the cables weighed one talent per 
cubit. In modern metric terms this becomes 26 kilograms per 46 
centimetres.222For convenience of calculation these numbers can be 
rounded off to twenty-five thousand grams per fifty centimetres.  The 
specific gravity of the cable can be taken as unity, so that the radius (r) of a 
cylinder of twenty-five thousand cubic centimetres in volume and length of 
fifty centimetres is:- 
         π x r2 x 50 = 25 000 
                                         so  r2 = 25 000/ (50 x π) 
                         = 159 
                         then  r =   12.6 centimetres 
            hence  diameter =  2r =  25 centimetres 
Hammond and Roseman calculate the diameter to have been 23 cm using  
rather more sophisticated  rope-making data.223  
 If it is accepted that Herodotus’ report of the size of the cables is 
correct, why did the Persians opt for six cables of such an unmanageable 
diameter?  Very large numbers of men would have been required to make 
them and get them into position on the bridges. If cables of one-eighth of 
the cross-sectional area had been woven, forty-eight would have been 
needed, each with a diameter of 9 cm, a size easily produced by the rope-
makers and not too thick to be grasped by the hand.  The breaking strain of 
eight 9cm diameter cables would be about the same as one of 25 cm 
diameter. 
 Darius I used the immense resources his Persian empire to carve the 
story of his triumphs into the almost unreachable cliffs of the Behistun Pass  
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high in the Zagros Mountains. His son, Xerxes, similarly demonstrated his 
power by employing thousands of men on the four-year task of cutting a 
canal through the Athos peninsular. His army of hundreds of thousands, fleet  
of thousands of ships and massive food dumps to feed them, showed those 
who dared oppose him, that the vast resources of men and treasure of the 
Persian empire could successfully overcome any resistance. Perhaps it was 
another demonstration of omnipotence that cables of such extraordinary 
size were fabricated for his bridges over the Hellespont, instead of using 
those of a size which would have been made by those he considered to be  
lesser  peoples.      
------oooo------ 
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Appendix  2. 
“Under the Lash” 
  Herodotus has been translated as using the phrase “under 
the lash” (7.23.) or “under the whips” (7.58.). The former refers to the 
workmen who were digging the Athos canal being “under the lash”, and 
the latter to the army crossing the bridge of boats being encouraged with 
whips to hurry them up the steep slopes behind the beaches. In the first 
case, several thousands of men would have been at work digging the 
canal. The reader is tempted with a mental picture of slaves groaning under 
overseers’ whips beloved of American makers of epic films. How and Wells  
in a comment on the words ‘υπο µατηκον (7.22.1), note that whipping was 
repulsive to free Greeks.224 Liddell and Scott interestingly translate 
’ορσσειν ‘υπο µαστιγων as “to dig by constraint of the lash” 
 Urging on the workmen with whips would have required a very 
large number of overseers who would have been much more productive if 
they had also helped to dig. Herodotus tells (7.117) of Artachaees, a high-
ranking Persian in charge of the work on the canal who had “the loudest 
voice in the world”. Perhaps he carried a whip as a symbol of office, and 
had some assistants, rather like Roman lictors, whose rods were symbolic 
rather than punitive. 
 In the second case it is hardly likely that elite troops like the “Ten 
Thousand” were whipped up the steep paths away from the Hellespont 
beaches by men who were their military and social inferiors.  A column 
climbing up a steep and narrow path cannot move faster then the slowest 
marchers.  Here again, it is perhaps better to think in terms of  an elite 
Persian “military police” who carried whips and certainly whipped the pack 
animals, but probably cracked them over the heads of the troops whilst 
shouting at the marching columns to “get a move on”. 
------oooo------ 
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Appendix 3. 
The Transport of Cereals 
 Professor J. Roth of San Jose State University, in a personal 
communication says that:-  
The Isis Geminiana fresco, Ostia (2nd/3rd century AD) shows the 
loading of a ship. A porter pours a sack (or leather bag) into what appears 
to be a barrel on the deck of the ship. The sack is labelled “RES” but is 
clearly grain. It seems to me that if the ship was loaded with sacks or bags 
this measuring out would have been unnecessary. This suggests that grain 
was loaded loose in ships. This seems unnecessary and uneconomical to us, 
but it may well have been that the cost of leather bags exceeded the 
labour costs of loading and unloading grain in this manner.  
 
It is to be hoped that underwater archaeology will be able to 
provide an answer to this question. In the meantime it is accepted that for 
reasons of economy the Persian grain was carried loose despite the risk of  
spoilage of the cargoes. 
------oooo------ 
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Appendix 4. 
The water requirements of trireme crews. 
         Herodotus does not discuss how much water was needed or carried 
by trireme crews, probably because it was common knowledge in his day.  
If, as it is suggested, thirst was a contributory factor to the Persian defeat at 
Salamis, the assertion requires substantiation. 
 As has been shown above, “Mediterranean mooring” on a  beach, 
would place very heavy demands on any nearby water source, and a long 
time would be needed before every man had had the opportunity to get 
ashore to quench his thirst and fill his water container. 
 On the morning of Salamis, the Persian crews had already been 
afloat overnight and most of the previous day, with very little respite - if any. 
Bowen poses the question; how much drinking water does an oarsman 
need at sea through an August day in the Aegean?225  He mentions the 
experience of Tim Severin whose “Argos” crew rationed themselves to one 
and a half litres a day whilst under sail in the Black Sea, and not rowing.226 
  He goes on to mention a rowing trial of the “Olympias”, a modern 
reconstruction of a trireme, where, in a passage of some eight and a half 
hours, each man had two litres of water available. He also has noted 
another two-hour trial row during which the oarsmen drank up to four litres 
of water. He quotes Coats and Morrisson’s observation that on a hot day 
the Olympias’ oarsmen needed a litre of water an hour when working hard. 
In his view the ancient oarsmen would almost certainly have taken gourds 
or skins of water aboard with them but would probably have been 
restrained in their use, being accustomed to drinking sparingly.  
  It can be concluded that the combined factors of length of beach 
and the volume of any water supply found nearby, set a limit to the number 
of ships which could use it. This was a serious logistical problem for the 
Persians, the solution of which required a survey of every beach in Thrace, 
Macedon and Greece likely to be needed by their fleet. 
------oooo------ 
                                             
225 Bowen: 359. 
226 Severin T.The Jason Voyage. Guild Publishing.London.1985. 
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Appendix 5. 
Nicias’ retreat from Syracuse. 
 Thucydides describes how Nicias arranged the order of march in his 
retreat from Syracuse, and in doing so leaves probably unanswerable 
questions. He relates that in forming up for the march, the forty thousand 
surviving men were divided into halves, the twenty thousand fittest under 
Nicias and the weaker men under Demosthenes. It is remarkable that in the 
confusion and dismay, Nicias was able to assign five thousand hoplites and 
fifteen thousand non-combatants to each group. C.F. Smith in the Loeb 
edition, Rex Warner in the Penguin and Grote in his “History of Greece” 
expand  ‘οχλον ’εντος  ειχον  οι ’οπλιται  at 7.78.2 to suggest that  the 
army formed up  in two hollow squares. 227   
 And now the army began the march, arrayed in a hollow 
square…The baggage-carriers and most of the miscellaneous throng were 
enclosed in the ranks of the hoplites. (Loeb). 
 
 The words “hollow square”, (which are not used by Thucydides), are 
contradicted by the next sentence which says that the hoplites surrounded 
the solid mass of non-combatants. The shape of the compact mass of men 
is not mentioned. We assume that the “miscellaneous throng” was 
unarmed, but as oarsmen were by that time being used to some extent as 
light infantry, they might have been able to pick up discarded weapons in 
order to defend themselves. The formation of a tightly-packed mass of non-
combatants protected by a ring of hoplites was unique in Greek military 
experience. How did Nicias know more or less accurately, the numbers of 
hoplites, oarsmen and camp-followers carrying the food and water 
supplies, which had to be organised into two equally sized groups?  It is 
unrealistic to suggest that he actually calculated the size of a square 
containing twenty thousand men, of whom about five thousand were 
hoplites. He probably got the solid mass of men and pack-animals into as 
compact a shape as possible, and then formed up the hoplites round them.  
                                             
227 Grote at 7. 463 says, a little differently; “The army was distributed in two 
divisions; the hoplites  marching in a hollow oblong ,with the baggage and 
unarmed in the interior.”   
 96
A hoplite needed a fighting space which Vegetius says was one metre 
laterally and two metres between ranks, so the two masses of men would 
have been more or less in a square or rectangular formation about 300 
metres wide at the start of their march.228  
 The previous year, Nicias had fought and defeated a Syracusan 
army whose line of battle was sixteen shields deep, whilst his hoplites were 
formed up in the more usual eight shield formation. He protected his non-
combatants with a reserve of hoplites eight shields deep.229 Thucydides 
gives the impression that Nicias expected the Syracusans to contest his 
retreat in a set-piece action using the same order of battle which had 
opposed him before. If that was so, his “squares” were not intended to be in 
order of march but rather in order of battle, some eight shields deep and 
over 140 wide.230 A battle line of that width and depth could punch a hole 
through the ranks of the opposing army and defeat it by sheer weight of 
numbers. If he had won the major battle, he anticipated, he would have 
been able to re-form into columns for his planned ascent of the Anopus 
valley and through the narrow gorge at its head-waters, where he did not 
expect to find any opposition. 
 Unfortunately for the Athenians, the Spartan general Gylippus, 
although trained in traditional hoplite warfare, unexpectedly made no 
attempt to oppose them with all his forces in a full-scale battle. The 
Athenians defeated the initial Syracusan opposition near the mouth of the 
Anopus, but as they turned up-stream, Gylippus used his numerous cavalry 
and javelin-throwers in “hit and run” attacks on the two Athenian 
formations. The Athenian cavalry was heavily outnumbered and fled. The 
constantly harassed Athenians reached the head of the valley only to find 
their path blocked by a wall and a Syracusan force “not a few shields 
deep” forcing them into a retreat which ended in disaster.  
 There have been several attempts from the 1890’s onwards to  
                                             
228 Webster: 1981, 231. quoting Vegetius 3.9. 
229 Thuc. 6.67.2. 
230 Assuming that the two groups were more or less in squares, there would 
have been about 140 in the outside ranks, being the square root of 20 000. 
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reconstruct Nicias’ march. Evans points out that the experience of a single  
scholar, walking the route of the retreat, is not an army. Unlike the Athenians 
he is not under attack whilst suffering hunger and thirst, and so cannot 
make a satisfactory reconstruction.231  
 Only the hoplites leading the march and those on the left hand side 
of the squares could offer immediate resistance to the Syracusan attacks.  
They carried their shields on their left arms, and so were ready to fight. Those 
on the right hand side would have had to turn right, and those at the rear to 
about turn, in order to face the enemy and shield themselves. This would 
have left the non-combatants unprotected whilst the hoplites stood and 
fought. The formations, whatever shape they were initially, would have 
been distorted in any case when marching over uneven, hilly country. It is 
unlikely that a regular shape could have been maintained through the first 
day of the march as the Athenians climbed the narrowing river valley under 
constant enemy pressure. Once again, hunger, and particularly thirst, were 
important elements in the defeat of the retreating army and cohesion 
would have been lost long before it was destroyed on the Assinarus eight 
days later.  
----oooo------ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             
231 My thanks are due to Dr. R. Evans for allowing me access to a proof of his 
forthcoming book, Ancient Syracuse: A Topographical History. Pretoria 2006 
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